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Abstract
Consider a data publishing setting for a dataset composed by both private and non-private
features. The publisher uses an empirical distribution, estimated from n i.i.d. samples, to
design a privacy mechanism which is applied to new fresh samples afterward. In this paper,
we study the discrepancy between the privacy-utility guarantees for the empirical distribution,
used to design the privacy mechanism, and those for the true distribution, experienced by
the privacy mechanism in practice. We first show that, for any privacy mechanism, these
discrepancies vanish at speed O(1/
√
n) with high probability. These bounds follow from our
main technical results regarding the Lipschitz continuity of the considered information leakage
measures. Then we prove that the optimal privacy mechanisms for the empirical distribution
approach the corresponding mechanisms for the true distribution as the sample size n increases,
thereby establishing the statistical consistency of the optimal privacy mechanisms. Finally, we
introduce and study uniform privacy mechanisms which, by construction, provide privacy to all
the distributions within a neighborhood of the estimated distribution and, thereby, guarantee
privacy for the true distribution with high probability.
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1 Introduction
Publishing of individual-level data is increasingly pervasive [2–4]. In many settings, directly disclosing
unmodified data may lead to a privacy risk through unwanted inferences, particularly if the data contains
(or is correlated with) private information. For example, suppose that a hospital wishes to share patient-
level data to further advance research on a certain disease. As shown by Sweeney [5], simply removing
private features from the dataset (e.g., name) does not necessarily guarantee privacy as these features usually
correlate with the remaining features in the dataset (e.g., ZIP code and gender). This modern data publishing
issue, also present in politics [6], business [7], and welfare [8] to name a few, requires data disclosure
methodologies with provable privacy guarantees, whilst still enabling a desired level of utility to be derived
from the disclosed data.
A common approach to ensure privacy consists of perturbing the data using a privacy mechanism: a
(possibly) randomized mapping designed to control private information leakage, the nature of which depends
on how privacy is quantified. Different notions of privacy leakage have been proposed to capture the ability
of different adversaries to learn (estimate) private information, e.g., Shannon’s mutual information [9, 10],
k-anonymity [11], differential privacy [12], maximal leakage [13], total variation [14], among others. In
addition, privacy mechanisms should also guarantee the statistical utility of the disclosed data, usually
quantified by some measure of similarity between the original and the perturbed data, e.g., distortion [15],
f -divergence [16], minimum mean-squared error [17]. In general, privacy and utility objectives compete with
each other, making the design of privacy mechanisms a non-trivial task. When data privacy and statistical
utility are measured using information-theoretic quantities (e.g., mutual information), most methods for the
analysis and design of privacy mechanisms rely on the implicit assumption that the data distribution is, for
the most part, known [10, 14, 18–25]. In practice, the designer has access only to a sample from the true
distribution.
In this work we consider the following setup. We assume that data has both private and non-private
features and, based on a sample of such pairs, the designer creates a randomized mapping called a privacy
mechanism. As new samples arrive, the designed mechanism is applied to the non-private features in order
to produce a sanitized version of them which is later disclosed. In this context, we assume that the adversary
(data analyst) knows the true distribution of the data, the privacy mechanism being used, and the disclosed
data set. The adversary’s objective is then to illegitimately infer the private features associated to the
disclosed data. We illustrate this procedure in Figure 1. Observe that this adversary is the strongest
in terms of statistical knowledge and hence serves as a worst case benchmark. Apart from its statistical
knowledge, we assume that the adversary has no side information regarding the disclosed data.
Since privacy mechanisms are designed using a sample, their privacy-utility guarantees might not general-
ize to the true distribution, thereby creating a privacy threat as the de facto guarantees might be considerably
different from those in the design phase. In this work, we study the effect of the discrepancy between the
empirical and true distributions on the analysis and design of privacy mechanisms.
First, we consider the setting where the privacy mechanism is designed using an estimate of the data
distribution to evaluate the privacy-utility guarantees. We derive bounds for the discrepancy between the
privacy-utility guarantees for the empirical distribution (type) and the true (unknown) data distribution. In
this context, these bounds can be used to asses the de facto guarantees of privacy mechanisms when deployed
in practice.
Next, we investigate the statistical consistency of the optimal privacy mechanisms1. More specifically,
assume that the privacy mechanism designer constructs an optimal privacy mechanism for the empirical
distribution. As the number of samples increases, the optimal privacy mechanism designed for the empirical
distribution naturally changes. We show that if such a sequence of privacy mechanisms converges, its limit
is an optimal privacy mechanism for the true data distribution.
Finally, we introduce the notion of uniform privacy mechanism. When privacy is a priority, the privacy
mechanism designer may be required to guarantee a specific level of privacy for the true distribution despite
having access only to an estimate of it. Motivated by this setting, we consider privacy mechanisms that, by
design, assure privacy for every distribution within a specific neighborhood of the empirical distribution. In
1Loosely speaking, a privacy mechanism is said to be optimal if it delivers the best possible utility constrained to
a prescribed amount of privacy leakage. Precise definitions are given in Section 2.3.
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Figure 1: Typical setting for the design and deployment of privacy mechanisms.
this case, large deviations results imply that privacy is guaranteed for the true distribution with a certain
probability (depending on the neighborhood). Since privacy is guaranteed uniformly on a neighborhood of
the empirical distribution, we name these privacy mechanisms as uniform privacy mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section we present our main contributions,
review related work, and introduce notation used in this paper. In Section 2 we review preliminaries, including
information leakage measures and large deviations results, and recall the framework of privacy-utility trade-
offs. Our main results for the discrepancy of privacy-utility guarantees, convergence properties, and uniform
privacy mechanisms are presented in Sections 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Finally, we illustrate some of the
results derived in this paper through two numerical experiments in Section 6 and provide concluding remarks
in Section 7.
1.1 Contributions
In Section 3, we provide probabilistic upper bounds for the difference between the privacy-utility guarantees
for the empirical and the true distributions under five different information metrics: probability of correctly
guessing, f -information with f locally Lipschitz, Arimoto’s mutual information (α-leakage) of order α > 1,
Sibson’s mutual information of order α > 1, and maximal α-leakage of order α > 1. These bounds, which
scale as O(1/
√
n) with n being the sample size, hold uniformly across all privacy mechanisms and, hence,
can be used even for privacy mechanisms that do not have explicit descriptions, e.g., the privacy mechanisms
implemented using neural networks in [26]. Explicit constants depending on the information metrics under
consideration are provided. The proofs of these bounds rely on known large deviations results [27] and
Lipschitz continuity properties of information leakage measures established in this paper. These continuity
properties can be combined with results for other estimation frameworks different from the large deviations
one, e.g., the `1-minimax setting in [28] and references therein. In those cases, the role of the empirical
estimator is naturally replaced by other estimators, e.g., the add-constant estimator in [28].
We study the convergence properties of optimal privacy mechanisms in Section 4. Specifically, we
consider the case when a privacy mechanism designer constructs a sequence optimal privacy mechanisms
for a sequence of joint distributions converging to the true distribution. In this context, we show that while
the sequence of optimal privacy mechanisms do not necessarily form a Cauchy sequence, the distance between
the privacy mechanisms in the sequence and the set of optimal privacy mechanisms with respect to the true
distribution does go to zero. This convergence is analyzed for information measures which satisfy three
technical conditions outlined in Section 4. These conditions are satisfied by probability of correctly guessing,
f -information with f locally Lipschitz, and Arimoto’s mutual information (α-leakage) of order α > 1. As
a by-product, we prove that, under these conditions, the privacy-utility function as a function of the joint
distribution is continuous except possibly at the boundary of its domain.
In Section 5, we introduce the notion of uniform privacy mechanism and prove the existence of optimal
uniform privacy mechanisms, i.e., uniform privacy mechanisms that attain the best utility in a max-min sense.
Optimal uniform privacy mechanisms are considerably harder to design than their non-uniform counterparts
as privacy has to be guaranteed for any distribution within a neighborhood of the empirical distribution.
Nonetheless, we show that they can be approximated by certain mechanisms designed to deliver privacy only
for the empirical distribution. This approximation result circumvents the highly non-trivial task of designing
optimal uniform privacy mechanisms.
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1.2 Related Work
Differential privacy is a popular measure of privacy which aims at answering queries while simultaneously
ensuring privacy of individual records in the database [12,29]. It does not take into account the distribution
of the entire dataset which results in its robustness with respect to the dataset distribution, a property that
is not satisfied a priori by information-theoretic privacy mechanisms. In this work we analyze the degree of
robustness to variations of the dataset distribution of certain information-theoretic measures of privacy.
The study of privacy from an information-theoretic point of view heavily depends on the chosen in-
formation metric. One commonly-used information leakage metric is Shannon’s mutual information [30]
and its generalizations [31]. In particular, both α-leakage and f -information — a special case of Csisza´r’s
f -divergence [32] — have been used to formulate the privacy-utility trade-offs problem, see e.g., Liao et
al. [33]. These generalizations seek to study privacy using information metrics that have appeared in the
information theory literature and carry some operational (statistical) meaning. There are also information
measures which have been introduced specifically in the context of privacy and information leakage. For
example, Issa et al. [13, 34] introduced a metric called maximal leakage to measure privacy leakage, later
extended by Liao et al. [35] in a tunable measure called α-leakage. Duchi et al. [36] presented locally differ-
ential privacy. We refer the reader to Wagner and Eckhoff [37] for a survey of privacy metrics and remark
that information metrics also shed light on many secrecy problems, e.g., cryptosystems with short keys [38],
side-channel attack [39], and entropic security [40,41].
Many methods to design information-theoretic privacy mechanisms (see Figure 1) have been proposed in
the past, see, e.g., [9,10,17,18,39,42]. However, all these works assume that the designer has full knowledge of
the data distribution. In practice, the designer may only have access to n i.i.d. samples, creating a mismatch
between the distribution used to design the privacy mechanism and the true one. We significantly generalize
the work of Wang and Calmon [22], which studies the robustness of privacy mechanisms when privacy and
utility are measured using χ2-information, to encompass a wide range of information leakage measures.
To be more specific, we show that for every information leakage measure considered (see Theorem 1), the
discrepancy between the privacy-utility guarantees for the empirical and true distributions scales as O(1/
√
n).
It is important to remark that, in the context of the information bottleneck, Shamir et al. [43] established
similar upper bounds for mutual information that scale as O(log(n)/
√
n). Hence, mutual information appears
to fall outside the scope of the techniques presented in this paper. A related problem is that of estimating
information-theoretic measures from a limited number of samples, as studied by, for example, Jiao et al. [44],
Wu and Yang [45] and Issa et al. [39] in the context of privacy. Our work differs from those as we do not
focus on the construction of estimators suited for a specific information leakage measure, instead we analyze
the performance of the plug-in estimator under different leakage measures. Given the ease of implementation
of this estimator, we believe our contributions might be of interest to practitioner.
The fundamental trade-offs between privacy guarantees and statistical utility in data disclosure have been
studied in several papers from an information-theoretic view. For example, Yamamoto [15] developed the
trade-off between rate, distortion, and equivocation for a specific source coding model. Rebollo-Monedero et
al. [9], Calmon and Fawaz [18], and Sankar et al. [10] characterized privacy-utility trade-offs using tools
from rate-distortion theory. Varodayan and Khisti [46] and Tan et al. [47] considered the privacy-energy
efficiency trade-off in smart meter systems. Makhdoumi et al. [48] showed the connection between the
privacy funnel and the information bottleneck proposed by Tishby et al. [49]. The privacy-utility function,
as presented in Section 2.3, has been analyzed to find the fundamental limits of privacy-utility trade-offs
under different metrics, see, e.g., Calmon et al. [50] and Asoodeh et al. [20]. It has been shown that this
function exhibits some common properties across different metrics. For example, it is continuous, concave,
and strictly increasing with respect to the privacy parameter, see also Wang and Calmon [22] and Asoodeh et
al. [17].
The study of robustness has appeared in many different areas, such as optimization [51], statistics [52],
artificial intelligence [53], and machine learning [54]. The notion of robustness considered in this work is
closely related to generalization in machine learning [55], which aim at analyzing different performances of
the learner’s output between training and testing phases. More specifically, a learner may output a classifier
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h which minimizes a given empirical risk over a sample S = (z1, · · · , zm), namely,
LS(h) ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
`(h, zi), (1)
where ` is a given loss function. Nonetheless, in practice, the same classifier h might exhibit a very different
true risk, defined as
L(h) , E [`(h, Z)] , (2)
where Z is a random variable distributed according to the dataset distribution. The goal of generalization is
to analyze the difference between the empirical risk and the true risk and derive bounds for this discrepancy.
This problem has been studied in computer science [56] and, recently, has been analyzed using tools from
information theory by Xu and Raginsky [57] and Russo and Zou [58]. Since most information-theoretic met-
rics do not seem to be expressible in terms of a loss function as in (2), classical generalization results cannot
be directly applied for analyzing the robustness of information-theoretic privacy mechanisms. Recently, the
robustness of privacy mechanisms has been investigated using tools from information theory in the works
of Wang and Calmon [22] and Issa et al. [39]. It is important to mention that some techniques developed
for privacy preservation, such as differential privacy, can be useful to analyze generalization guarantees, as
shown by Dwork et al. [59–61].
1.3 Notation
Given random variables U and U ′ supported over a finite alphabet U and another random variable V
supported over a finite alphabet V, we let PU ′ · PV |U be the joint distribution over U × V determined by
(PU ′ · PV |U )(u, v) = PU ′(u)PV |U (v|u). (3)
Observe that with this notation, PU · PV |U = PU,V . Given another random variable V˜ supported over a
finite alphabet V˜, we let PV˜ |UPV |V˜ be the transition probability matrix determined by
(PV˜ |UPV |V˜ )(v|u) =
∑
v˜∈V˜
PV˜ |U (v˜|u)PV |V˜ (v|v˜). (4)
We let S and X be two random variables with discrete supports S and X , respectively. We let P denote
the joint distribution PS,X and Pˆ be a generic estimate of P . The empirical distribution obtained from
n i.i.d. samples drawn from P is denoted by Pˆn. We let (Pn)
∞
n=1 be any sequence of joint distributions
converging to the joint distribution P . Any generic distribution over S × X is denoted by Q. Also, any
sequence of distributions over S × X is denoted by (Qn)∞n=1.
Let (A, dA) and (B, dB) be two metric spaces. We say that f : A → B is Lipschitz over A′ ⊆ A if there
exists L ≥ 0 such that, for all a1, a2 ∈ A′,
dB(f(a1), f(a2)) ≤ LdA(a1, a2). (5)
For convenience, we summarize some common notation in Table 1.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Setup
In this section, we review preliminary material regarding information leakage measures and large deviations
bounds for distribution estimation. In addition, we formally introduce the problems addressed in this paper.
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Category Notation Meaning
Norms
‖a‖α α-norm with α ∈ [1,∞): (
∑
i|ai|α)1/α
‖a‖∞ ∞-norm: maxi|ai|
Joint Distributions
P True joint distribution: PS,X
Pˆ Estimated distribution: PˆS,X
Pˆn Empirical distribution obtained from n i.i.d. samples
(Pn)
∞
n=1 Any sequence of joint distributions converging to P
Q Any joint distribution over S × X
(Qn)
∞
n=1 Any sequence of joint distributions over S × X
Channels W Any privacy mechanism (channel) from X to Y
Sets
W Set of all privacy mechanisms
WN Set of all privacy mechanisms from X to {1 . . . , N}
P Set of all joint distributions over S × X
Q Any closed subset of P
Table 1: List of notation used in this paper.
2.1 Information Leakage Measures
Here we review the definition and some basic properties of information leakage measures which are commonly
used in the literature. An information leakage measure L(U → V ) quantifies how much information V leaks
about U . Specifically, U and V can represent raw and disclosed datasets, respectively, and, in this case,
L(U → V ) measures the utility of the disclosed dataset. On the other hand, when U and V represent
private information and information available to an adversary, then L(U → V ) quantifies the adversary’s
ability of inferring U from the observation of V . In the privacy literature it is valuable to relate information
leakage measures with a specific loss/gain function (implicitly) adopted by an adversary. In what follows, we
review a range of information leakage measures along with their operational meanings in terms of loss/gain
functions.
2.1.1 α-Leakage
In an effort to unify several information leakage measures within a single framework, Liao et al. recently
introduced an information leakage measure called α-leakage [35].
Definition 1 (Definition 4, [35]). Let U and V be two random variables supported over finite sets U and
V, respectively. For α ∈ (1,∞), the α-leakage from U to V is defined as
Lα(U → V ) , α
α− 1 log
max
Uˆ :U→V→Uˆ
E
[
Pr(Uˆ = U |U, V )α−1α
]
max
Uˆ :U |= Uˆ
E
[
Pr(Uˆ = U |U)α−1α
] . (6)
The value of Lα(U → V ) is extended by continuity to α = 1 and α =∞.
In terms of the adversarial setting described at the beginning of this section, α-leakage with α ∈ (1,∞]
can be interpreted as the multiplicative increase, upon observing V , of the expected gain of an adversary. In
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order to make this observation precise, note that the expected value in the denominator of the logarithmic
term in (6) equals
E
[
Pr(Uˆ = U |U)α−1α
]
=
∑
u∈U
PU (u)PUˆ (u)
α−1
α . (7)
In particular, the RHS of (7) equals expected gain of PUˆ w.r.t. the gain function
gain(u, PUˆ ) = PUˆ (u)
α−1
α . (8)
Thus, the denominator of the logarithmic term in (6) is the largest expected gain of an adversary with no
additional information apart from the distribution of U . Also, the expected value in the numerator of the
logarithmic term in (6) equals
E
[
Pr(Uˆ = U |U, V )α−1α
]
=
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈V
PU,V (u, v)PUˆ |V (u|v)
α−1
α . (9)
Thus, the numerator of the logarithmic term in (6) is the largest expected gain of an adversary that has access
to V and the joint distribution of U and V . From these observations we conclude that Lα(U → V ) measures
the multiplicative increase of the best expected gain upon observing V . In a similar way, L1(U → V ) can
be interpreted as additive increase, upon observing V , of the expectation of the gain function
gain(u, PUˆ ) = logPUˆ (u). (10)
In addition to its operational definition, α-leakage can be related to Arimoto’s mutual information [62,63]
whose definition is provided below.
Definition 2. Let U and V be two random variables supported over finite sets U and V, respectively. Their
Arimoto’s mutual information of order α ∈ (1,∞) is defined as
IAα (PU,V ) ,
α
α− 1 log
∑
v‖PU,V (·, v)‖α
‖PU (·)‖α . (11)
Also, by continuous extension,
IA1 (PU,V ) , I(PU,V ) and IA∞(PU,V ) , log
∑
v maxu PU,V (u, v)
maxu PU (u)
, (12)
where I(PU,V ) denotes Shannon’s mutual, i.e., I(PU,V ) ,
∑
u
∑
v PU,V (u, v) log
PU,V (u, v)
PU (u)PV (v)
.
In [35], Liao et al. proved that α-leakage is indeed equal to Arimoto’s mutual information of order α.
Proposition 1 (Theorem 1, [35]). Let U and V be two random variables supported over finite sets U and
V, respectively. For α ∈ [1,∞], α-leakage satisfies
Lα(U → V ) = IAα (PU,V ). (13)
The previous proposition shows that α-leakage recovers Shannon’s mutual information in the extremal
case α = 1. It is important to point out that Shannon’s mutual information has been extensively used in
the context of privacy. Of particular relevance for the present papers are the works of Rebollo-Monedero
et al. [9], Sankar et al. [10], Calmon and Fawaz [18], Asoodeh et al. [20], and references therein. On the
other extreme, when α =∞, α-leakage is closely related to another information leakage measure: probability
of correctly guessing. This information leakage measure, whose definition is recalled next, has been used
recently in the context of privacy-utility trade-offs by Asoodeh et al. [17] and in the broader privacy literature
by Smith [64], Braun et al. [65], Barthe and Kopf [66], and references therein.
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Definition 3. Let U and V be two random variables supported over finite sets U and V, respectively. The
probability of correctly guessing U and the probability of correctly guessing U given V are given by
Pc(U) , max
u∈U
PU (u), (14)
Pc(U |V ) ,
∑
v∈V
max
u∈U
PU,V (u, v). (15)
As its name suggests, Pc(U) is equal to the (largest) probability of correctly guessing U without any side
information but the distribution of U . Similarly, Pc(U |V ) is equal to the (largest) probability of correctly
guessing U given V and the joint distribution PU,V . This interpretation can be made precise using the
adversarial setting and the gain function defined in (8) with α =∞. Indeed, a straightforward manipulation
shows that
Pc(U) = max
Uˆ :U |= Uˆ
E
(
1U=Uˆ
)
and Pc(U |V ) = max
Uˆ :U→V→Uˆ
E
(
1U=Uˆ
)
, (16)
which corresponds to the adversarial setting under the 0-1 loss. Observe that under this loss, the optimal
adversary strategy is the same as the maximum a posteriori (MAP) decoder in the communication literature.
Finally, observe that
L∞(U → V ) = log Pc(U |V )
Pc(U)
, (17)
evidencing the intrinsic relation between ∞-leakage and probability of correctly guessing.
Remark 1. Despite the close relation between ∞-leakage and probability of correctly guessing, we always
treat them separately. On the one hand, probability of correctly guessing is of interest in its own right. On
the other hand, the results for probability of correctly guessing are easier to derive than their ∞-leakage
counterparts. As a result, working explicitly with probability of correctly guessing allows us to present the
key techniques used in this paper while keeping the technical difficulties at a minimum.
In [34, 39], Issa et al. introduced the notion of maximal leakage in order to quantify the adversary’s
capability to infer any (randomized) function of U from V . Motivated by this notion, Liao et al. introduced
maximal α-leakage, a tunable information leakage measure that is equal to maximal leakage when α =∞.
Definition 4 (Definition 5, [35]). Let U and V be two random variables supported over finite sets U and
V, respectively. For α ∈ [1,∞], the maximal α-leakage from U to V is defined as
Lmaxα (U → V ) , sup
T :T→U→V
Lα(T → V ), (18)
where T represents any (randomized) function of U that takes values on a finite but arbitrary alphabet.
Arimoto’s mutual information can be regarded as a generalization of Shannon’s mutual information, see,
e.g., [31]. Another such generalization is Sibson’s mutual information [67] which, as shown below, is also
related to maximal α-leakage.
Definition 5 (Definition 4, [31]). Let U and V be two random variables supported over finite sets U and
V, respectively. Their Sibson’s mutual information of order α ∈ (1,∞) is defined as
ISα(PU,V ) ,
α
α− 1 log
∑
v∈V
‖PU (·)1/αPV |U (v|·)‖α. (19)
Also, IS1 (PU,V ) = I(PU,V ) and I
S
∞(PU,V ) = log
∑
v maxu PV |U (v|u).
The following proposition shows that maximal α-leakage is the Arimoto’s capacity under an input support
constraint which, in turn, is equal to Sibson’s capacity under the same constraint.
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Proposition 2 (Theorem 2, [35]). Let U and V be two random variables supported over finite sets U and
V, respectively. For α ∈ (1,∞], maximal α-leakage satisfies
Lmaxα (U → V ) = sup
PU˜
IAα (PU˜ · PV |U ) = sup
PU˜
ISα(PU˜ · PV |U ), (20)
where the support of PU˜ is a subset of the support of PU
2. Also, Lmax1 (U → V ) = I(PU,V ).
In particular, maximal α-leakage of order infinity (i.e., maximal leakage) is the Sibson’s mutual informa-
tion of order infinity.
Proposition 3 (Corollary 1, [34]). Let U and V be two random variables supported over finite sets U and
V, respectively. Then,
Lmax∞ (U → V ) = IS∞(PU,V ). (21)
2.1.2 f-Information
We finish our review on information leakage measures by recalling the definition and some basic properties
of f -information. This information leakage measure is defined in terms of Csisza´r’s f -divergence whose
definition is recalled next for the reader’s convenience.
Definition 6 (Definition 1.1, [32]). Let f : (0,∞)→ R be a convex function with f(1) = 0. Assume that Q1
and Q2 are two probability distributions over a finite set Z and that Q1  Q2. The f -divergence between
Q1 and Q2 is given by
Df (Q1‖Q2) ,
∑
z∈Z
Q2(z)f
(
Q1(z)
Q2(z)
)
. (22)
Given a function f as in the previous definition, its corresponding f -information is defined as follows.
Definition 7. Let f : (0,∞) → R be a convex function with f(1) = 0. Furthermore, let U and V be two
random variables supported over finite sets U and V, respectively. Their f -information is defined by
If (PU,V ) , Df (PU,V ‖PUPV )
=
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈V
PU (u)PV (v)f
(
PU,V (u, v)
PU (u)PV (v)
)
.
(23)
While an f -information may not have a straightforward interpretation in operational terms for a specific
function f , many functions f do, e.g., mutual information and χ2-information discussed below. Hence, a
general treatment allows us to simultaneously handle those f -information for which there is a concrete opera-
tional meaning and those whose operational interpretation is yet to be discovered. More recent developments
about the properties of f -divergence can be found in Raginsky [68], Calmon et al. [69], and the references
therein.
In the context of privacy, χ2-information is a fine example of an f -information with a tangible operational
interpretation. Following the standard convention, the χ2-information between two random variables U and
V is defined as χ2(PU,V ) , If (PU,V ) with f(t) = (t − 1)2. Relying on the so-called principal inertia
components (PICs) [70], Calmon et al. [71] showed that if χ2(U ;V ) <  for some 0 <  < 1, then the
minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) of reconstructing any zero-mean unit-variance function of U given V
is lower bounded by 1− , i.e., no function of U can be reconstructed with small MMSE given an observation
of V . Thus, χ2-information measures an adversary’s ability to reconstruct functions of U from V under an
MMSE loss. Recently, χ2-information has been used in the context of privacy-utility trade-offs by Wang and
Calmon in [22].
2In [35, Theorem 2], PU˜ ranges over the distributions with the same support as PU . However, their proof readily
implies Proposition 2 as stated in this work.
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2.2 Large Deviations Bounds for Distribution Estimation
Now we review some preliminary results regarding the distance between the empirical and true distributions.
Throughout this work, we measure the distance between two probability distributions over Z, say Q1 and
Q2, by their `1-distance which is given by
‖Q1 −Q2‖1,
∑
z∈Z
|Q1(z)−Q2(z)|. (24)
A result by Weissman et al. [27, Theorem 2.1] establishes that, for all  > 0,
Pr
(
‖Pˆn − P‖1≥ 
)
≤ (2|Z| − 2) exp(−nφ(piP )2/4), (25)
where P is a probability distribution over the finite set Z, Pˆn is the empirical distribution obtained from n
i.i.d. samples from P , piP , maxA⊆Zmin{P (A), 1− P (A)}, and
φ(p) ,
{
1
1−2p log
1−p
p p ∈ [0, 1/2),
2 p = 1/2.
(26)
Note that φ(p) ≥ 2 for all p ∈ [0, 1/2]. Hence,
Pr
(
‖Pˆn − P‖1≥ 
)
≤ exp(|Z|) exp(−n2/2). (27)
By taking Z = S × X and  =
√
2
n (|S|·|X |− log β), inequality (27) implies that, with probability at least
1− β,
‖Pˆn − P‖1≤
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β). (28)
Even though in this paper we focus on large deviations results, it is worth pointing out that the order
O(
√|S|·|X |/n) is present in other fundamental settings, e.g., the minimax expected loss framework in [28,
Corollary 9].
2.3 Problem Setup
Suppose that S is a variable to be hidden (e.g., political preference) and X is an observed variable (e.g., movie
ratings) that is correlated with S. In order to receive some utility (e.g., personalized recommendations), we
would like to disclose as much information about X without compromising S. An approach with rigorous
privacy guarantees is to release a new random variable Y produced by applying a randomized mapping to
X, hence forming a Markov chain S → X → Y . This mapping, called the privacy mechanism, is designed
to satisfy a specific privacy constraint.
In the sequel, we assume that S and X are discrete random variables with support sets S and X ,
respectively. Let W be the set of all privacy mechanisms which take X as input and display a discrete
random variable Y as output. More specifically, let
W ,
⋃
N≥1
{
W ∈ [0, 1]|X |×N : ∀x ∈ X ,
N∑
y=1
W (x, y) = 1
}
. (29)
Through this work, we denote the joint distribution of S and X by P and the privacy mechanism producing
Y from X by W , i.e., W = PY |X . The privacy leakage and the utility generated by a mapping W ∈ W
for the true distribution P are denoted by L(P,W ) and U(P,W ), respectively. Throughout this paper, L
and U are either probability of correctly guessing, f -information with f locally Lipschitz, Arimoto’s mutual
information (α-leakage) of order α ∈ (1,∞], Sibson’s mutual information of order α ∈ (1,∞], or maximal
α-leakage of order α ∈ (1,∞].
In this framework, a natural problem is to characterize the fundamental trade-off between privacy and
utility as captured by the following definition. We denote by P the set of all probability distributions over
S × X .
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Definition 8. For a given joint distribution P ∈ P and  ≥ inf
W∈W
L(P,W ), the privacy-utility function is
defined as
H(P ; ) , sup
W∈D(P ;)
U(P,W ), (30)
where D(P ; ) , {W ∈ W : L(P,W ) ≤ }. Furthermore, the collection of all optimal privacy mechanisms
for P at  is defined as
W∗(P ; ) , {W ∈ W : L(P,W ) ≤ , U(P,W ) = H(P ; )}. (31)
Observe that, by definition, D(P ; ) is the set of all privacy mechanisms providing an -privacy guarantee
for P . Hence, the privacy-utility function in Definition 8 quantifies the best utility achieved by any privacy
mechanism providing an -privacy guarantee for P .
This specific type of privacy-utility trade-off (PUT), and the optimal privacy mechanisms associated to
it, has been investigated for several measures of privacy and utility, see, for example, [14, 17, 20, 22]. These
investigations often rely on the implicit assumption that the data distribution is, for the most part, known.
However, in practice, the data distribution may only be accessed through a limited number of samples. In
this work, we revisit this assumption and study its implications in the design and performance of privacy
mechanisms. Next we present the problems addressed and the main contributions of this paper.
2.3.1 Discrepancy of Privacy-Utility Guarantees
In practice, the designer may not have access to the true distribution P , but only to samples drawn from this
distribution. In this case, the privacy-utility guarantees for a distribution estimated from the samples, say
Pˆ , and the true distribution P might be different. For any given privacy mechanism W , these discrepancies
are effectively quantified by
|L(Pˆ ,W )− L(P,W )| and |U(Pˆ ,W )− U(P,W )|. (32)
In Section 3 we provide probabilistic upper bounds for the discrepancies in (32) when the estimated distri-
bution Pˆ is the empirical distribution Pˆn of n i.i.d. samples drawn from P . These upper bounds depend
on the sample size n, the alphabet sizes |S| and |X |, and, in some cases, the probability of the least likely
symbol of the marginals of Pˆn. Their derivations rely on the large deviations results recalled in Section 2.2
and continuity properties of information leakage measures established in this work. We summarize these
results in the following meta theorem. For ease of notation, we let
Lc(Q,W ) , Pc(S|Y ) and Uc(Q,W ) , Pc(X|Y ), (33)
where S → X → Y is such that PS,X = Q and PY |X = W . With this notation, we define Lf (Q,W ) ,
If (PS,Y ), LAα (Q,W ) , IAα (PS,Y ), LSα(Q,W ) , ISα (PS,Y ), and, by abuse of notation, Lmaxα (Q,W ) ,
Lmaxα (S → Y ). The analogues for utility are defined in a similar way.
Theorem 1. Let Pˆn be the empirical distribution obtained from n i.i.d. samples drawn from P . Then, with
probability at least 1− β, for any W ∈ W, we have
|L(Pˆn,W )− L(P,W )|
≤
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β) ·

1 when L = Lc,
Cf,mS when L = Lf with f locally Lipschitz,
2α
α−1 |S|1−1/α when L = LAα with α ∈ (1,∞],
2α+1
(α−1)m1−1/αS
when L = LSα with α ∈ (1,∞),
2
mins
∑
x Pˆn(s,x)
when L = LS∞ or L = Lmax∞ ,
4α|S|1−1/α
(α−1)mins
∑
x Pˆn(s,x)
when L = Lmaxα with α ∈ (1,∞),
(34)
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|U(Pˆn,W )− U(P,W )|
≤
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β) ·

1 when U = Uc,
Cf,mX when U = Uf with f locally Lipschitz,
2α
α−1 |X |1−1/α when U = UAα with α ∈ (1,∞],
1
(α−1)m1−1/αX
when U = USα with α ∈ (1,∞),
0 when U = US∞ or U = Umaxα with α ∈ (1,∞],
(35)
where Cf,u = 2Kf,u−1 + (2u
−1 + 1)Lf,u−1 with Kg,u, Lg,u, mS and mX as defined in (41), (42), (56), and
(57), respectively.
We illustrate the discrepancies of privacy-utility guarantees in (34) and (35) along with the corresponding
upper bounds through a synthetic and a real-world datasets in Section 6.
2.3.2 Convergence of Optimal Privacy Mechanisms
Assume there is a sequence of joint distributions (Pn)
∞
n=1 converging to the true distribution P . The results
provided in Section 3 establish that the privacy-utility guarantees for Pn converge to those of P as n goes
to infinity. Nonetheless, they cannot be used to study the convergence properties of the optimal privacy
mechanisms of Pn as defined in (31). In Section 4 we address the convergence of optimal privacy mechanisms
by further exploiting some of the Lipschitz continuity properties established for the information leakage
measures under consideration. To be more specific, assume that the privacy mechanism designer constructs
an optimal privacy mechanism W ∗n for each Pn, i.e., W
∗
n ∈ W∗(Pn; ). We establish the convergence of
the sequence of optimal privacy mechanisms (W ∗n)
∞
n=1 to the set of optimal privacy mechanisms for P ,
i.e., W∗(P ; ). Due to technical considerations, this result covers only probability of correctly guessing,
f -information with f locally Lipschitz, and Arimoto’s mutual information of order α with α ∈ (1,∞].
2.3.3 Uniform Privacy Mechanisms
In applications where privacy is a priority, a specific privacy guarantee for the true distribution P may be
required, even though the designer has only access to a distribution Pˆ estimated from samples. We propose
the following procedure to overcome this difficulty: (a) use large deviations results to find a probabilistic up-
per bound, say r, for the distance between Pˆ and P ; (b) design privacy mechanisms that deliver the required
privacy guarantee for all distributions at distance less or equal than r from Pˆ . Based on this procedure, we
introduce the definition of uniform privacy mechanisms in Section 5. We prove that optimal uniform privacy
mechanisms exist and while their design might be challenging, they can be efficiently approximated by op-
timal privacy mechanisms for Pˆ as defined in (31). We finish Section 5 establishing convergence properties
of optimal uniform privacy mechanisms similar to those in Section 4.
3 Discrepancy of Privacy-Utility Guarantees
We provide probabilistic upper bounds for the difference between the privacy-utility guarantees of the em-
pirical and the true distributions. These upper bounds do not depend on the specific privacy mechanism.
In order to simplify the exposition, we assume that privacy leakage and utility are measured using the same
information metric. Nonetheless, the case when different information metrics are used can be handled in a
straightforward manner. In this section, we study five different information metrics: probability of correctly
guessing, f -information with f locally Lipschitz, Arimoto’s mutual information (α-leakage) of order α > 1,
Sibson’s mutual information of order α > 1, and maximal α-leakage of order α > 1.
3.1 Probability of Correctly Guessing
The main result of this subsection relies on the following lemma which establishes the Lipschitz continuity
of the mappings Lc(·,W ) and Uc(·,W ). Recall that for Q ∈ P and W ∈ W,
Lc(Q,W ) , Pc(S|Y ) and Uc(Q,W ) , Pc(X|Y ), (36)
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where S → X → Y is such that PS,X = Q and PY |X = W .
Lemma 1. For any Q1, Q2 ∈ P and W ∈ W, we have
|Lc(Q1,W )− Lc(Q2,W )| ≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (37)
|Uc(Q1,W )− Uc(Q2,W )| ≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (38)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In particular, when Q1 = Pˆ is an estimate of Q2 = P , the previous lemma implies that any upper bound
on ‖Pˆ−P‖1 translates into an upper bound for difference of the corresponding privacy-utility guarantees. The
following theorem specializes this observation to the empirical distribution by means of the large deviations
inequality in (28).
Theorem 2. Let Pˆn be the empirical distribution obtained from n i.i.d. samples drawn from P . Then, with
probability at least 1− β, for any W ∈ W, we have
|Lc(Pˆn,W )− Lc(P,W )| ≤
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β), (39)
|Uc(Pˆn,W )− Uc(P,W )| ≤
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β). (40)
In Section 6.2 we illustrate the fitness of the bounds in Theorem 2 when applied to ProPublica’s COMPAS
dataset [72].
Remark 2. Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 illustrate the general technique we use to derive (probabilistic) upper
bounds for the difference between the privacy-utility guarantees of the empirical and the true distributions.
Specifically, we relate the difference between the privacy-utility guarantees of two joint distributions with
their `1 distance, and then we use large deviations results to provide upper bound for the `1 distance between
the empirical and the true distributions.
3.2 f-Information with f Locally Lipschitz
We start establishing the following notation. For a given function g : [0,∞)→ R and u > 0, we let
Kg,u , sup{|g(t)|: t ∈ [0, u]}. (41)
The constant Kg,u is the so-called supremum norm of g on [0, u]. In addition, if g is Liptschitz on [0, u], we
let Lg,u be its Lipschitz constant on [0, u], i.e.,
Lg,u , min{L ≥ 0 : |g(t1)− g(t2)|≤ L|t1 − t2|,∀t1, t2 ∈ [0, u]}. (42)
A function g : [0,∞) → R is called locally Lipschitz if g is Lipschitz on [0, u] for every u > 0. Note that
a locally Lipschitz function is not necessarily Lipschitz on [0,∞). For example, the function g(t) = t2 is
locally Lipschitz with Lg,u = 2u for all u > 0, but it is not Lipschitz on [0,∞). For any two distributions
Q1, Q2 ∈ P, we denote
mS , min
{∑
x∈X
Qi(s, x) : s ∈ S, i ∈ {1, 2}
}
, (43)
mX , min
{∑
s∈S
Qi(s, x) : x ∈ X , i ∈ {1, 2}
}
. (44)
Observe thatmS (resp.mX) equals the probability of the least likely symbol among the marginal distributions
over S (resp. X ) of Q1 and Q2. In other words, if (Si, Xi) has joint distribution Qi for each i ∈ {1, 2}, then
mS = min{PSi(s) : s ∈ S, i ∈ {1, 2}}, (45)
mX = min{PXi(x) : x ∈ X , i ∈ {1, 2}}. (46)
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The following lemma serves as an analogue of Lemma 1 for an f -information with f locally Lipschitz.
Recall that for Q ∈ P and W ∈ W,
Lf (Q,W ) , If (PS,Y ) and Uf (Q,W ) , If (PX,Y ), (47)
where S → X → Y is such that PS,X = Q and PY |X = W .
Lemma 2. If f : [0,∞)→ R is locally Lipschitz, then, for any Q1, Q2 ∈ P and W ∈ W, we have
|Lf (Q1,W )− Lf (Q2,W )| ≤ Cf,mS‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (48)
|Uf (Q1,W )− Uf (Q2,W )| ≤ Cf,mX‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (49)
where Cf,u = 2Kf,u−1 + (2u
−1 + 1)Lf,u−1 with u ∈ {mS ,mX}.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Remark 3. Despite the similarity between Lemmas 1 and 2, the latter does not imply that the mapping
Lf (·,W ) is Lipschitz continuous. Indeed, the factor Cf,mS depends on Q1 and Q2 through mS . Nonetheless,
Lemma 2 does show that the local Lipschitzianity of f is bequeathed to Lf (·,W ). Specifically, for every
δ > 0, the mapping Lf (·,W ) is Lipschitz continuous over{
Q ∈ P : δ ≤ min
s∈S
∑
x∈X
Q(s, x)
}
, (50)
and its Lipschitz constant is less than or equal to Cf,δ. Indeed, this assertion follows from the fact that
the mapping u 7→ Cf,u is non-increasing as exhibited in Appendix A.3. Hence, any lower bound for mS
translates into an upper bound for Cf,mS in (48). As shown below, the local Lipschitzianity of Lf (·,W ) is
enough to derive a bound similar to (39). A similar discussion can be held for Uf (·,W ).
We illustrate the value of Cf,u, defined in Lemma 2, through the following examples:
• Total variation distance. If f(t) = 12 |t − 1|, then f is (globally) Lipschitz with Lf,u = 12 and Kf,u =
1
2 max{1, u− 1} for all u > 0. Consequently,
Cf,u = u
−1 max{1 + 3u/2, 2− u/2}; (51)
• χ2-divergence. If f(t) = (t− 1)2, then f is locally Lipschitz with Lf,u = 2 max{1, u− 1} and Kf,u =
max{1, (u− 1)2} for all u > 0. Consequently,
Cf,u = 2u
−2 max{2u+ 2u2, 3− 3u}; (52)
• Hellinger divergence. If fα(t) = t
α − 1
α− 1 with α > 1, then fα is locally Lipschitz with Lfα,u =
αuα−1
α− 1
and Kf,u =
1
α−1 max{1, uα − 1} for all u > 0. Consequently,
Cf,u =
u−α
α− 1 max{2α+ αu+ 2u
α, (2α+ 2) + αu− 2uα}. (53)
Note, however, that mutual information cannot be handled by Lemma 2 since the function f(t) = t log(t) is
not locally Lipschitz. In fact, mutual information seems to have a different asymptotic behavior w.r.t. the
sample size n when compared to the theorems in this paper, cf. [43, Theorem 3].
Relying on Lemma 2 and the large deviations inequality in (28), the next theorem provides a data depen-
dent bound for the discrepancy between the guarantees provided for the empirical and the true distributions.
For x ∈ R, we let (x)+ = max{0, x}.
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Theorem 3. Let Pˆn be the empirical distribution obtained from n i.i.d. samples drawn from P . If the
function f : [0,∞)→ R is locally Lipschitz, then, with probability at least 1− β, for any W ∈ W, we have
|Lf (Pˆn,W )− Lf (P,W )| ≤ Cf,mS
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β), (54)
|Uf (Pˆn,W )− Uf (P,W )| ≤ Cf,mX
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β), (55)
where Cf,u = 2Kf,u−1 + (2u
−1 + 1)Lf,u−1 with u ∈ {mS ,mX},
mS ,
(
min
{∑
x∈X
Pˆn(s, x) : s ∈ S
}
−
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β)
)
+
, (56)
mX ,
(
min
{∑
s∈S
Pˆn(s, x) : x ∈ X
}
−
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β)
)
+
. (57)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Remark 4. Observe that up to an additive factor of (2(|S|·|X |− log β)/n)1/2, which is negligible in the large
n regime, mS equals the probability of the least likely symbol of the marginal distribution over S of Pˆn.
As a consequence, the bound in (54) is data-dependent, while the bound in (39) is data-independent. This
discrepancy comes mainly from the fact that Lc(·,W ) is Lipschitz continuous, as established in Lemma 1,
while Lf (·,W ) is locally Lipschitz in the sense of Remark 3. A similar discussion holds for utility.
In most practical scenarios, the alphabet of X is significantly larger than the alphabet of S, e.g., S
might be political preference while X is movie ratings, S might be private household information while X is
smart meter data, S might be gender while X is a profile picture, etc. In particular, when the sample size
is limited, the bounds in Theorem 3 might become ineffective due to the potentially small value of mX . In
order to alleviate this issue, we propose the following pre-processing technique which combines the symbols
of X with less observations in the dataset.
Given γ ≥ 0 and a symbol x0 not belonging to X , we let Πγ be the mapping with input alphabet X ,
output alphabet
Xγ , {x0} ∪
{
x ∈ X :
∑
s∈S
Pˆ (s, x) ≥ γ
}
, (58)
and determined by
Πγ(x) =
{
x if
∑
s Pˆ (s, x) ≥ γ,
x0 otherwise.
(59)
The proposed pre-processing technique consists in applying this mapping to the samples {(si, xi)}ni=1 to
obtain the modified samples {(si,Πγ(xi))}ni=1. Clearly, this pre-processing technique improves the bounds
in Theorem 3 by increasing mX . However, this improvement might come at a price in utility, as shown in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let γ ≥ 0 be given and let Pˆn be the empirical distribution of n samples {(si, xi)}ni=1. If
Pˆγ is the empirical distribution of the modified samples {(si,Πγ(xi))}ni=1, then, for any  ∈ R such that
W∗(Pˆγ ; ) 6= ∅,
Hf (Pˆγ ; ) ≤ Hf (Pˆn; ), (60)
where Hf denotes the privacy-utility function when both privacy leakage and utility are measured using f -
information.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The proof of Proposition 4 relies on the following lemma.
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Lemma 3. Let γ ≥ 0 be given. If X → X0 → Y0 is a Markov chain with X0 = Πγ(X), then, for every
f -information,
If (PX,Y0) = If (PX0,Y0). (61)
Observe that Lemma 3 is an immediate consequence of the data processing inequality (DPI) for f -
information [73, Remark 2.3] and the fact that X0 is a deterministic function of X. Indeed, if Π : X → X0
is any deterministic function and X0 , Π(X), then any random variable Y0 satisfies X0 → X → Y0. In
particular, the DPI implies that If (PX,Y0) ≥ If (PX0,Y0). If, in addition, Y0 is a randomized function of X0,
i.e., X → X0 → Y0, then the DPI leads to If (PX,Y0) ≤ If (PX0,Y0).
3.3 Arimoto’s Mutual Information, Sibson’s Mutual Information, and Maximal
α-Leakage
We now establish continuity properties of Arimoto’s mutual information, Sibson’s mutual information, and
maximal α-leakage similar to those proved in Lemmas 1 and 2 for probability of correctly guessing and
f -information, respectively. Upon these properties, we state two theorems regarding the discrepancy of
privacy-utility guarantees for the information measures at hand.
Recall that for Q ∈ P and W ∈ W,
LAα (Q,W ) , IAα (PS,Y ) and UAα (Q,W ) , IAα (PX,Y ) , (62)
where S → X → Y is such that PS,X = Q and PY |X = W . The following lemma shows the Lipschitz
continuity of LAα (·,W ) and UAα (·,W ).
Lemma 4. Let α ∈ (1,∞]. For any Q1, Q2 ∈ P and W ∈ W,
|LAα (Q1,W )− LAα (Q2,W )| ≤
2α
α− 1 |S|
1−1/α‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (63)
|UAα (Q1,W )− UAα (Q2,W )| ≤
2α
α− 1 |X |
1−1/α‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (64)
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Remark 5. Recall that probability of correctly guessing and Arimoto’s mutual information of order ∞ are
related through the formula
IA∞(U ;V ) = log
Pc(U |V )
Pc(U)
. (65)
Observe that, despite this relation, the bound for probability of correctly guessing in (37) and the corre-
sponding bound for Arimoto’s mutual information of order ∞ in (63) differ by a factor of 2|S|. As shown in
the proof of Lemma 4, the |S| factor comes from the log in (65) via the minimum in the following inequality∣∣∣log a
b
∣∣∣ ≤ |a− b|
min{a, b} , a, b > 0. (66)
A similar argument explains the extra factor of 2|X | appearing in (64) w.r.t. its counterpart in (38).
Now we consider Sibson’s mutual information. Recall that for Q ∈ P and W ∈ W,
LSα(Q,W ) , ISα (PS,Y ) and USα(Q,W ) , ISα (PX,Y ) , (67)
where S → X → Y is such that PS,X = Q and PY |X = W . The following lemma establishes that the
mappings LSα(·,W ) and USα(·,W ) have similar continuity properties to those of Lf (·,W ) and Uf (·,W ) with
f locally Lipschitz.
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Lemma 5. For Q1, Q2 ∈ P, we define mS and mX as in (43) and (44), respectively. If α ∈ (1,∞), then,
for any W ∈ W,
|LSα(Q1,W )− LSα(Q2,W )| ≤
2α+ 1
α− 1
‖Q1 −Q2‖1
m
1−1/α
S
, (68)
|USα(Q1,W )− USα(Q2,W )| ≤
1
α− 1
‖Q1 −Q2‖1
m
1−1/α
X
. (69)
If α =∞, then, for any W ∈ W,
|LS∞(Q1,W )− LS∞(Q2,W )| ≤
2‖Q1 −Q2‖1
mins
∑
xQ1(s, x)
, (70)
|US∞(Q1,W )− US∞(Q2,W )| = 0. (71)
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Remark 6. A straightforward manipulation shows that
exp
(
IA∞(PU,V )
)
=
∑
v∈V
max
u∈U
PU (u)
maxu′ PU (u′)
PV |U (v|u), (72)
exp
(
IS∞(PU,V )
)
=
∑
v∈V
max
u∈U
PV |U (v|u). (73)
From (72) and (73), we observe that Sibson’s mutual information of order infinity is independent of the input
distribution PU , while Arimoto’s mutual information of the same order is not. By comparing (63) and (70),
we also observe that the privacy leakage bound for Sibson’s mutual information of order infinity does depend
on the probability of the least likely symbol of the input3, while its Arimoto’s counterpart does not. These
seemingly contradicting facts have a rather intuitive cause: it is hard to estimate PV |U (·|u) reliably if PU (u)
is small. Observe that while PV |U (v|u) appears in both (72) and (73), the factor PU (u)/maxu′ PU (u′) in (72)
makes Arimoto’s mutual information of order infinity less dependent on symbols u with small probabilities
PU (u). The difficulty in estimating Sibson’s mutual information in comparison to its Arimoto counterpart is
also natural from a privacy perspective. As proved by Issa et al. in [34], Sibson’s mutual information guar-
antees privacy for any (possibly randomized) function of S, while Arimoto’s mutual information guarantees
privacy only for S itself.
We end up this section showing that maximal α-leakage (α > 1) behaves in a similar way to Sibson’s
mutual information of order ∞. Recall the notation in Section 1.3 and that, for Q ∈ P and W ∈ W,
Lmaxα (Q,W ) , sup
PS˜
IAα
(
PS˜ · (PX|SW )
)
and Umaxα (Q,W ) , sup
P
X˜
IAα
(
PX˜ ·W
)
, (74)
where S → X → Y is such that PS,X = Q and PY |X = W .
Lemma 6. Let α ∈ (1,∞). For any Q1, Q2 ∈ P and W ∈ W,
|Lmaxα (Q1,W )− Lmaxα (Q2,W )| ≤
4α
α− 1
|S|1−1/α
mins
∑
xQ1(s, x)
‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (75)
|Umaxα (Q1,W )− Umaxα (Q2,W )| = 0. (76)
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
We summarize the probabilistic upper bounds derived in this subsection in the following two theorems.
They follow immediately from Lemma 4, 5, 6 and the large deviations inequality in (28).
3In recent work [39], Issa et al. established a bound similar to (79) which also depends on the probability of the
least likely symbol of the input. Thus, this dependency seems unavoidable at the moment.
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Theorem 4. Let Pˆn be the empirical distribution obtained from n i.i.d. samples drawn from P . Then, with
probability at least 1− β, for any W ∈ W, we have
|L(Pˆn,W )− L(P,W )|≤
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β) ·
{
2α
α−1 |S|1−1/α when L = LAα with α ∈ (1,∞],
2α+1
(α−1)m1−1/αS
when L = LSα with α ∈ (1,∞), (77)
|U(Pˆn,W )− U(P,W )|≤
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β) ·
{
2α
α−1 |X |1−1/α when U = UAα with α ∈ (1,∞],
1
(α−1)m1−1/αX
when U = USα with α ∈ (1,∞), (78)
where mS and mX are defined in (56) and (57), respectively.
Theorem 5. Let Pˆn be the empirical distribution obtained from n i.i.d. samples drawn from P . Then, with
probability at least 1− β, for any W ∈ W, we have
|L(Pˆn,W )− L(P,W )|≤
2
√
2
n (|S|·|X |− log β)
mins
∑
x Pˆn(s, x)
·
{
1 when L = LS∞ or L = Lmax∞ ,
2α|S|1−1/α
α−1 when L = Lmaxα with α ∈ (1,∞),
(79)
and |U(Pˆn,W )− U(P,W )|= 0 when U = US∞ or U = Umaxα with α ∈ (1,∞].
4 Convergence of Optimal Privacy Mechanisms
Now we study the consistency of the optimal privacy mechanisms using, among other results, the (local)
Lipschitz continuity of the mappings L(·,W ) and U(·,W ) established in the previous section.
Assume that the privacy mechanism designer is given an  ∈ R and a sequence of joint distributions
(Pn)
∞
n=1 converging to the true distribution P . Furthermore, the designer constructs an optimal -private
mechanism W ∗n for each Pn. In this section, we analyze some convergence properties of the sequence of
optimal privacy mechanisms (W ∗n)
∞
n=1.
In the sequel, we assume that prior knowledge about the true distribution P might be available. Ac-
cordingly, we let Q ⊆ P be the set of all joint distributions compatible with such prior knowledge. Note
that when no prior knowledge is available, we simply let Q = P. The main results of this and the following
section are established under the following conditions.
There exist a closed set Q ⊆ P and N ∈ N such that
(C.1) Continuity. For every Q ∈ Q, the mappings L(Q, ·) and U(Q, ·) are continuous over
WN ,W ∩ R|X |×N , (80)
where W, as defined in (29), denotes the set of all privacy mechanisms. Furthermore, the mapping
H(Q; ·) is continuous over [min(Q),∞), where
min(Q) , inf {L(Q,W ) : W ∈ W} . (81)
(C.2) Lipschitz Continuity. There exist positive constants CL and CU such that, for all Q1, Q2 ∈ Q and
W ∈ WN ,
|L(Q1,W )− L(Q2,W )|≤ CL‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (82)
|U(Q1,W )− U(Q2,W )|≤ CU‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (83)
(C.3) Support. For each Q ∈ Q and  ≥ min(Q), the intersection W∗(Q; ) ∩WN is not empty.
These three conditions might seem restrictive at a first glance. Nonetheless, as shown in Section 4.1
below, they are satisfied by probability of correctly guessing, f -information with f locally Lipschitz, and
Arimoto’s mutual information of order α with α ∈ (1,∞].
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Note that condition (C.1) is a continuity requirement. Specifically, it requires the privacy leakage and
utility functions to be continuous w.r.t. the privacy mechanism W . Also, it requires the privacy-utility
function to be continuous w.r.t. the privacy parameter . Similarly, condition (C.2) requires the privacy
leakage and utility functions to be Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. the joint distribution Q. Observe that the
constants CL and CU in (82) and (83), respectively, do not depend on the joint distributions Q1 and Q2
neither on the privacy mechanism W . Nonetheless, these constants may depend on Q and N .
Remark 7. Observe that the set WN is in correspondence with the set of all privacy mechanisms from X
to {1, . . . , N}. In particular, condition (C.3) requires that, for each Q ∈ Q and  ≥ min(Q), there exists an
optimal -private mechanism for Q supported over {1, . . . , N}. As a consequence,
H(Q; ) = max
W∈DN (Q;)
U(Q,W ), (84)
where DN (Q; ) , {W ∈ WN : L(Q,W ) ≤ }. Furthermore, the intersection of WN and all optimal privacy
mechanisms is defined as
W∗N (P ; ) , {W ∈ WN : L(P,W ) ≤ , U(P,W ) = H(P ; )}. (85)
By comparing (30) and (84), we can observe that condition (C.3) allows us to replace the unbounded set
W with the compact space WN in the optimization defining the privacy-utility function H. This technical
difference is crucial in the proofs of the subsequent results. In a similar spirit, observe that condition (C.3)
also implies that
min(Q) = min {L(Q,W ) : W ∈ WN} . (86)
A two-variable function might be continuous in each argument without being jointly continuous, see,
e.g., [74, Ex. 4.7]. The following lemma is an immediate, yet important, consequence of conditions (C.1–2),
as it establishes the joint continuity of the privacy leakage and utility functions.
Lemma 7. Assume that conditions (C.1–2) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
The functions L(·, ·) and U(·, ·) are continuous over Q×WN .
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Building upon Lemma 7, we establish the following proposition which plays a key role in the proofs of
the main results of this section.
Proposition 5. Assume that conditions (C.1–3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
For any given  ∈ R, the mapping H(·; ) is continuous over {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) < }.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Remark 8. The mapping H(·; ) might not be continuous over {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) ≤ }. In order to prove
this claim, consider the following example.
Example 1. For each ζ ∈ [0, 1/2], let Qζ be the joint distribution of (S,Xζ) where S ∼ Ber(1/2) and
PXζ |S = BSC(ζ). By definition, Hc denotes the privacy-utility function when both privacy leakage and
utility are measured using probability of correctly guessing. By Theorem 2 in [17], we have that, for every
ζ ∈ [0, 1/2),
min(Qζ) = 1/2 and Hc(Qζ ; 1/2) = 1/2. (87)
Since S and X1/2 are independent, we also have that
min(Q1/2) = 1/2 and Hc(Q1/2; 1/2) = 1. (88)
Therefore, lim
ζ↑1/2
Hc(Qζ ; 1/2) 6= Hc(Q1/2; 1/2) although lim
ζ↑1/2
Qζ = Q1/2.
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Despite that H(·; ) might be discontinuous at the boundary {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) = }, as presented in
Example 1, in some situations such pathological behavior is not exhibited. In such cases, the following
corollary provides conditions for which the pointwise convergence established in Proposition 5 upgrades
into uniform convergence. This technical result will be useful in explaining the numerical experiments in
Section 6.
Corollary 1. Assume that conditions (C.1–3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
In addition, assume that there exists 0 ∈ R such that min(Q) = 0 for all Q ∈ Q. If Pn ∈ Q for each n ∈ N,
limn Pn = P , and limn H(Pn; 0) = H(P ; 0), then H(Pn; ·) converges uniformly to H(P ; ·) over [0,∞), i.e.,
lim
n→∞ sup∈[0,∞)
|H(Pn; )− H(P, )|= 0. (89)
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
The next theorem shows that if W ∗n is an optimal -private mechanism for Pn and (Pn)
∞
n=1 converges
to P , then the sequence of optimal -private mechanisms (W ∗n)
∞
n=1 converges to the set of optimal -private
mechanisms for P . For W ∈ WN and a subset W ′ ⊆ WN , the distance between W and W ′ is defined as
dist(W,W ′) , inf{‖W −W ′‖1: W ′ ∈ W ′}, (90)
where ‖W −W ′‖1=
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
|W (x, y)−W ′(x, y)|.
Theorem 6. Assume that conditions (C.1–3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
Let  ∈ R be given. If Pn ∈ Q for each n ∈ N, limn Pn = P , and min(P ) < , then, for any sequence
(W ∗n)
∞
n=1 ⊂ WN such that W ∗n ∈ W∗N (Pn; ),
lim
n→∞ dist(W
∗
n ,W∗N (P ; )) = 0. (91)
Furthermore, if Pn = Pˆn is the empirical distribution obtained from n i.i.d. samples drawn from P , then
Pr
(
lim
n→∞ dist(W
∗
n ,W∗N (P ; )) = 0
)
= 1. (92)
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Remark 9. Under the assumptions in Theorem 6, it may be possible that W∗N (Pn; ) is empty for some
values of n. Nonetheless, under the same assumptions, W∗N (Pn; ) is non-empty for n sufficiently large. This
fact can be easily derived from the continuity of the mapping min(·) which is the content of Lemma 15 in
Appendix B.4.
The following corollary follows directly from Theorem 6 and the compactness of W∗N (P ; ) established
in Lemma 16 in Appendix B.4. It shows that the limit of optimal -private mechanisms is also an optimal
-private mechanism.
Corollary 2. In addition to the assumptions in Theorem 6, assume that limnW
∗
n = W0 for some W0 ∈ WN .
Then, W0 ∈ W∗N (P ; ).
It is important to note that Theorem 6 does not imply that the sequence of optimal privacy mechanisms
(W ∗n)
∞
n=1 converges to a privacy mechanism. Indeed, it has been noticed in simulation that a small pertur-
bation to the joint distribution might lead to a big change to the optimal privacy mechanism returned by
some optimization algorithms. The following theorem, whose proof relies on standard results from set-valued
analysis [75], shows that given a sequence (Pn)
∞
n=1 with limn Pn = P , it is possible to choose W
∗
n ∈ W∗N (Pn; )
such that (W ∗n)
∞
n=1 is convergent. However, we prove this property only for a residual set which, by definition,
is a countable intersection of dense open subsets of Q ⊂ R|S|×|X|.
Theorem 7. Assume that conditions (C.1–3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
For any given  ∈ R and any δ > 0, there exists a residual set Q′ ⊆ {Q ∈ Q : min(Q)+δ ≤ } which satisfies
that:
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For any joint distribution Q0 ∈ Q′, any sequence of joint distributions (Qn)∞n=1 ⊂ {Q ∈ Q : min(Q)+δ ≤ }
with limnQn = Q0, and any optimal privacy mechanism W
∗
0 ∈ W∗N (Q0; ), there exists a sequence of privacy
mechanisms (W ∗n)
∞
n=1 such that W
∗
n ∈ W∗N (Qn; ) for each n ∈ N and limnW ∗n = W ∗0 .
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
Remark 10. Baire’s theorem states that any residual subset of a complete metric space is dense, see,
e.g., [76, Thm. 5.6]. In this sense, residual sets are considered to be big in topological terms. However,
residual sets might be negligible in measure theoretic terms, see, e.g., [77, Exercise 5.3.31].
4.1 Continuity and Compactness Conditions
In this section we show that probability of correctly guessing, f -information with f locally Lipschitz, Ari-
moto’s mutual information of order α with α ∈ (1,∞] satisfy conditions (C.1–3).
4.1.1 Probability of Correctly Guessing
We choose Q = P and Y = {1, . . . , N} with N ≥ |X |+1. Note that Q = P corresponds to the case where
no prior information about the true distribution P is available. Recall that, by definition,
Lc(Q,W ) =
∑
y∈Y
max
s∈S
∑
x∈X
Q(s, x)W (x, y), (93)
Uc(Q,W ) =
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
∑
s∈S
Q(s, x)W (x, y). (94)
Since the maximum and the sum of continuous functions are continuous functions as well, we have that, for
every Q ∈ P, the mappings Lc(Q, ·) and Uc(Q, ·) are continuous over WN . In [17], Asoodeh et al. showed
that Hc(Q; ·), the privacy-utility function associated to Lc and Uc, is continuous and piecewise linear over4
[min(Q),∞). Therefore condition (C.1) is satisfied. Furthermore, Lemma 1 shows that, for any Q1, Q2 ∈ P
and W ∈ W,
|Lc(Q1,W )− Lc(Q2,W )| ≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (95)
|Uc(Q1,W )− Uc(Q2,W )| ≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (96)
which implies that condition (C.2) is satisfied with CL = CU = 1. It was established in [17] that, for
every  ≥ min(Q), there is always an optimal -private mechanism using at most |X |+1 symbols. As a
consequence, condition (C.3) holds true as N ≥ |X |+1 by assumption.
4.1.2 f-Information with f Locally Lipschitz
Assume that f : [0,∞) → R is a locally Lipschitz convex function with f(1) = 0. Given γ > 0, we choose
N ≥ |X |+1 and
Q =
{
Q ∈ P : γ ≤ min
s∈S
∑
x∈X
Q(s, x), γ ≤ min
x∈X
∑
s∈S
Q(s, x)
}
. (97)
In this case, the prior information about the true distribution P = PS,X comes in the form of the assumption
that the probability mass functions of S and X are bounded away from 0. Recall that, by definition,
Lf (Q,W ) =
∑
s∈S
∑
y∈Y
PS(s)PY (y)f
(
PS,Y (s, y)
PS(s)PY (y)
)
, (98)
Uf (Q,W ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
PX(x)PY (y)f
(
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
, (99)
4Indeed, in this setting min(Q) = maxs
∑
xQ(s, x).
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where S → X → Y is such that PS,X = Q and PY |X = W . Note that if Q ∈ Q, then, for all (s, x, y) ∈
S × X × Y,
max
{
PS,Y (s, y)
PS(s)PY (y)
,
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
}
≤ γ−1. (100)
Upon this fact, it is straightforward to verify that the mappings Lf (Q, ·) and Uf (Q, ·) are continuous over
WN . In [78], Hsu et al. established the continuity of Hf (Q; ·) over [0,∞). Hence, condition (C.1) is satisfied.
Recall the definitions of Kg,u and Lg,u in (41) and (42), respectively. Lemma 2 shows that, for any Q1, Q2 ∈ Q
and W ∈ W,
|Lf (Q1,W )− Lf (Q2,W )| ≤ (2Kf,γ−1 + (2γ−1 + 1)Lf,γ−1)‖Q1 −Q2‖1,
|Uf (Q1,W )− Uf (Q2,W )| ≤ (2Kf,γ−1 + (2γ−1 + 1)Lf,γ−1)‖Q1 −Q2‖1,
which implies that condition (C.2) is satisfied with
CL = CU = 2Kf,γ−1 + (2γ
−1 + 1)Lf,γ−1 . (101)
For example, if f(x) = |x− 1|, then CL = CU ≤ 4γ−1 + 1; and if f(x) = x2 − 1, then CL = CU ≤ 8γ−2. As
with probability of correctly guessing, there is always an optimal -private mechanism using at most |X |+1
symbols [78]. From this fact, condition (C.3) follows immediately.
4.1.3 Arimoto’s Mutual Information
Let α ∈ (1,∞]. We choose N ≥ |X |+1 and Q = P, i.e., no prior information is assumed. As with the
previous information measures, the continuity of the mappings LAα (Q, ·) and UAα (Q, ·) is evident. We denote
the privacy-utility function by HAα when both privacy leakage and utility are measured using Arimoto’s
mutual information of order α. Note that the graph of HAα (Q; ·) corresponds to the upper boundary of the
set
A , {(LAα (Q,W ),UAα (Q,W )) : W ∈ W} . (102)
Specifically, HAα (Q; ) = sup{u : (p, u) ∈ A, p ≤ }. Consider the transformation
(p, u) 7→
(∥∥∥∑
x∈X
Q(·, x)
∥∥∥
α
eαp/(α−1),
∥∥∥∑
s∈S
Q(s, ·)
∥∥∥
α
eαu/(α−1)
)
. (103)
It is straightforward to verify that this transformation is one-to-one, continuous, and monotone coordinate-
wise. Using this transformation, it can be shown that (the upper boundary of) A is homeomorphic to (the
upper boundary of)
B , {(φ(Q,W ), ψ(Q,W )) : W ∈ W} , (104)
where φ(Q,W ) ,
∑
y‖
∑
xQ(·, x)W (x, y)‖α and ψ(Q,W ) ,
∑
y‖
∑
sQ(s, ·)W (·, y)‖α. By the homogeneity
of the α-norm, it can be verified that
φ(Q, [λ1W1, . . . , λKWK ] =
K∑
k=1
λkφ(Q,Wk), (105)
whenever K ∈ N, W1, . . . ,WK ∈ W, and λ1, . . . , λK ≥ 0 with
∑
k λk = 1. A similar equality holds for
ψ. Therefore, B is a convex set and, as a consequence, its upper boundary is the graph of a continuous
function. Since the upper boundaries of A and B are homeomorphic, we conclude that the mapping HAα (Q; ·)
is continuous. Therefore, condition (C.1) is satisfied. Also, Lemma 4 implies that condition (C.2) is satisfied
with CL =
2α
α− 1 |S|
1−1/α and CU =
2α
α− 1 |X |
1−1/α. Observe that proving condition (C.3) with N ≥ |X |+1
is equivalent to show that any point in the upper boundary of A can be written as (LAα (Q,W ),UAα (Q,W )) for
some W ∈ WN . Since A and B are homeomorphic, the latter property can be established from an analogous
property for B which in turn follows from a minor adaptation of the argument in [79].
Remark 11. Regarding condition (C.3), both [17] and [78] build upon the convex analysis argument em-
ployed by Witsenhausen and Wyner in [79]. More specifically, they rely on an extension of Carathe´odory’s
theorem, the so-called Fenchel-Eggleston theorem [80], in order to find a bound for the size of the output
alphabet of an optimal privacy mechanism.
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5 Uniform Privacy Mechanisms
In this section we consider the scenario in which delivering privacy is the top priority for the privacy mecha-
nism designer. We introduce privacy mechanisms that, with a certain probability, guarantee privacy for the
true distribution despite having access only to an estimate of it. These mechanisms are constructed in the
following conceptual way. Recall that large deviations results show that, with a certain probability, the true
distribution is within some `1 ball of the empirical distribution. Consequently, if a mechanism guarantees
privacy uniformly for every distribution within such an `1 ball, it necessarily guarantees privacy for the true
distribution with at least the same probability. In this section, we prove that there is a well-defined notion
of optimality for uniform privacy mechanisms and that these optimal mechanisms can be approximated by
appropriately chosen (non-uniform) optimal privacy mechanisms as previously defined in (31).
In order to introduce uniform privacy mechanisms precisely, recall that inequality (28) shows that, with
probability at least 1− exp(|S|·|X |−nr2/2), the true distribution P is within the `1 ball of radius r centered
at the empirical distribution Pˆn,
Qr(Pˆn) , {Q ∈ Q : ‖Q− Pˆn‖1≤ r}. (106)
Based on this observation, we consider uniform privacy mechanisms which guarantee privacy for every
joint distribution within Qr(Pˆ ), where Pˆ is any estimate of P . Despite the fact that P ∈ Qr(Pˆ ) with
high probability, we do not know the true value of P . For this reason, we define optimal uniform privacy
mechanisms as those that achieve the best worst-case utility within Qr(Pˆ ).
Definition 9. Let Q ⊂ P and N ∈ N be given. For Pˆ ∈ Q,  ≥ 0, and r ≥ 0, we define the set of uniform
privacy mechanisms for Qr(Pˆ ) at  as
DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r) ,
⋂
Q∈Qr(Pˆ )
{W ∈ WN : L(Q,W ) ≤ } . (107)
Furthermore, we define the set of optimal uniform privacy mechanisms for Qr(Pˆ ) at  as
W†Q,N (Pˆ ; , r) , arg max
W∈DQ,N (Pˆ ;,r)
Ur(Pˆ ,W ), (108)
where Ur(Pˆ ,W ) , min
Q∈Qr(Pˆ )
U(Q,W ).
Recall that, as defined in Remark 7, DN (Q; ) = {W ∈ WN : L(Q,W ) ≤ } is the set of all privacy
mechanisms in WN delivering an -privacy guarantee for Q. Thus,
DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r) =
⋂
Q∈Qr(Pˆ )
DN (Q; ) (109)
is the set of all privacy mechanisms in WN that deliver an -privacy guarantee uniformly for all the distri-
butions in Qr(Pˆ ), i.e., all the distributions at a distance less than or equal to r from Pˆ . For a given privacy
mechanism W , Ur(Pˆ ,W ) quantifies the least utility U(Q,W ) attained by W over all the distributions in
Qr(Pˆ ). Thus, by definition, W†Q,N (Pˆ ; , r) is the set of all uniform privacy mechanisms for Qr(Pˆ ) at  with
the best worst-case utility.
The following lemma shows that Definition 9 is well-defined under conditions (C.1–2). Specifically, it
shows that the infimum defining Ur(Pˆ ,W ) and the supremum defining W†Q,N (Pˆ ; , r) are attainable.
Lemma 8. Assume that conditions (C.1–2) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
Then
(i) inf{U(Q,W ) : Q ∈ Qr(Pˆ )} is attainable for every W ∈ WN ;
(ii) sup{Ur(Pˆ ,W ) : W ∈ DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r)} is attainable whenever DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r) is not empty.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
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Observe that (ii) shows that optimal uniform privacy mechanisms do exists as long as DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r)
is not empty. Nonetheless, their construction might be challenging as the construction of optimal privacy
mechanisms in the non-uniform sense, as defined in (31), is already non-trivial in most cases. The following
theorem shows that optimal privacy mechanism can be modified to deliver a uniform privacy guarantee
without incurring in a big cost in terms of utility. Throughout this section, we consistently use W ∗ to
denote optimal privacy mechanisms, i.e., elements inW∗N as defined in (85), and W † to denote their uniform
counterparts as defined in (108).
Theorem 8. Assume that conditions (C.1–3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
If P ∈ Qr(Pˆ ) and − CLr ≥ min(Pˆ ), then
∅ 6= DN (Pˆ ; − CLr) ⊆ DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r). (110)
Furthermore, for every W ∗ ∈ W∗N (Pˆ ; − CLr) and W † ∈ W†Q,N (Pˆ ; , r),
U(P,W ∗) ≥ U(P,W †)−
(
H(Pˆ ; + CLr)− H(Pˆ ; − CLr) + 2CUr
)
. (111)
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Observe that (110) establishes that privacy mechanisms for Pˆ at  − CLr are, in fact, uniform privacy
mechanisms at . In other words, (110) shows that by imposing a slightly stronger privacy requirement for
Pˆ , we obtain uniform privacy mechanisms for Qr(Pˆ ). Furthermore, under condition (C.1),
lim
r↓0
(
H(Pˆ ; + CLr)− H(Pˆ ; − CLr) + 2CUr
)
= 0. (112)
Therefore, (111) shows that, when r is small, any optimal privacy mechanism for Pˆ at  − CLr performs
almost as well as any optimal uniform privacy mechanism for Qr(Pˆ ) at . Of course, all these conclusions
hold as long as P ∈ Qr(Pˆ ) but, as pointed out before, this is the case (with high probability) in the large
sample size regime.
Remark 12. Note that if H(Pˆ ; ·) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant L, then (111) becomes
U(P,W ∗) ≥ U(P,W †)− 2(CU + LCL)r. (113)
Observe that if H(Pˆ ; ·) is a convex function differentiable at 0 , min(Pˆ ), then L = H′(Pˆ ; 0). The value of
H′(Pˆ ; 0) is closely related with the notion of reverse strong data processing inequality [19], see also [20].
Now we consider a specific example to illustrate the above results.
Example 2. Recall that Hc is the privacy-utility function associated to Lc and Uc as given in (36). For ease
of notation, we define
p#q ,
(
(1− p)(1− q) (1− p)q
pq p(1− q)
)
. (114)
Let Q = {p#q : p ∈ [1/2, 1], q ∈ [0, 1−p]} and N ≥ 2. This selection of Q captures the case where S ∼ Ber(p)
with p ∈ [1/2, 1] and PX|S = BSC(q) with q ∈ [0, 1− p]. By Theorem 2 in [17], for all Q = p#q ∈ Q,
Hc(Q; ) = 1− 1− q
p− q (p+ q − 2pq) + 
p+ q − 2pq
p− q , (115)
whenever  ∈ [p, 1 − q]. In particular, Hc(Q; ·) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant p+ q − 2pq
p− q .
Recall that, for probability of correctly guessing, CL = CU = 1 as established in Section 4.1.1. Hence, under
the assumptions of Theorem 8, (113) becomes
U(P,W ∗) ≥ U(P,W †)− 2pˆ(1− qˆ)
pˆ− qˆ r, (116)
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where W ∗ ∈ W∗N (Pˆ ;  − r) and W † ∈ W†Q,N (Pˆ ; , r) with Pˆ , pˆ#qˆ ∈ Q. Furthermore, by taking Pˆ = Pˆn
and r = (2(4− log β)/n)1/2, inequality (28) implies that, with probability at least 1− β,
U(P,W ∗) ≥ U(P,W †)− 2pˆ(1− qˆ)
pˆ− qˆ
√
2
n
(4− log β). (117)
We finish this section by studying some convergence properties of uniform privacy mechanism, similar to
those studied in Theorem 6. More specifically, the next theorem shows that although a sequence (W †n)
∞
n=1
with W †n ∈ W†Q,N (Pn; , rn) may not be convergent, the distance between each W †n and W∗N (P ; ) converges
to zero as long as limn Pn = P and limn rn = 0. Furthermore, it also shows that, under certain conditions,
this convergence can be guaranteed almost surely for the empirical distribution estimator.
Theorem 9. Assume that conditions (C.1–3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
Let  ∈ R be given. If Pn ∈ Q with ‖Pn − P‖1≤ rn for each n ∈ N, limn rn = 0, and  > min(P ), then, for
any sequence (W †n)
∞
n=1 ⊂ WN such that W †n ∈ W†Q,N (Pn; , rn) for all n ≥ 1,
lim
n→∞ dist(W
†
n,W∗N (P ; )) = 0. (118)
Furthermore, if Pn = Pˆn is the empirical estimator obtained from n i.i.d. samples drawn from P and, for
some p > 1, rn ≥
√
2p log(n)
n for all n ≥ 1, then,
Pr
(
lim
n→∞ dist(W
†
n,W∗N (P ; )) = 0
)
= 1. (119)
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
The following corollary follows immediately from Thereom 9 by taking P = Pn = Pˆ .
Corollary 3. Assume that conditions (C.1–3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
If Pˆ ∈ Q and  > min(Pˆ ), then
lim sup
r↓0
W†Q,N (Pˆ ; , r) ⊆ W∗N (Pˆ ; ), (120)
where
lim sup
r↓0
W†Q,N (Pˆ ; , r) ,
{
W ∈ WN : lim inf
r↓0
dist
(
W,W†Q,N (Pˆ ; , r)
)
= 0
}
. (121)
Theorem 8 shows that in terms of performance, optimal privacy mechanisms approximate optimal uni-
form privacy mechanisms in the small r regime. The previous corollary shows that, in the same regime,
optimal uniform privacy mechanisms are geometrically close to the set of optimal privacy mechanisms.
These two results evidence an intrinsic relation between optimal privacy mechanisms and their uniform
counterparts.
6 Numerical Experiments
We illustrate some of the results derived in the previous sections through two numerical experiments. The
first experiment, conducted on a synthetic dataset, illustrates the convergence of the empirical privacy-utility
function and optimal privacy mechanisms to their corresponding limits as the sample size increases. The
second experiment, performed on a real-world dataset, displays the discrepancy between the privacy-utility
guarantees during the design and testing of a privacy mechanism.
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6.1 Synthetic Dataset
Here we illustrate the convergence of the empirical privacy-utility function and optimal privacy mechanisms
as the sample size increases. The joint distribution matrix P with Ps,x , P (s, x) is chosen to be
P =
(
0.42 0.18
0.16 0.24
)
, (122)
and both privacy leakage and utility are measured using χ2-information, i.e., the f -information associated
to f(t) = (t− 1)2. For any given value of n, we randomly select n i.i.d. samples {(si, xi)}ni=1 drawn from the
joint distribution P and compute the empirical distribution Pˆn.
In Figure 2 (top left), we depict the privacy-utility function Hχ2(P ; ·) and the empirical privacy-utility
function Hχ2(Pˆn; ·) for three different values of n. Note that the privacy-utility function of the empirical
distribution converges (pointwise) to the corresponding function for the true distribution, i.e., for any given
 ≥ 0 we have that Hχ2(Pˆn; ) approaches Hχ2(P ; ) as n grows. This corroborates the conclusion of Propo-
sition 5 which establishes that, for any given  ∈ R, H(·; ) is continuous over {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) < }. In
Figure 2 (top right), we depict the corresponding optimal privacy mechanisms. In order to visualize a privacy
mechanism PY |X in the xy-plane, we let the x-axis and y-axis to be the values of PY |X(0|0) and PY |X(1|1),
respectively. Observe that optimal privacy mechanisms are not unique. Hence, depending on the algorithm
used to obtain such mechanisms, a sequence of empirical optimal privacy mechanisms may not converge to
a fixed mechanism. However, as observed from Figure 2 (top right), the distance between any such sequence
and the set of optimal privacy mechanisms for the true distribution will necessarily converge to zero which
echoes Theorem 6.
Finally we scatter plot the largest (signed) gap, denoted by ∆n, between Hχ2(Pn; ·) and Hχ2(P ; ·). In
particular, the absolute value of ∆n is equal to the uniform norm of the function Hχ2(Pn; ·)−Hχ2(P ; ·), i.e.,
|∆n|= sup
∈[0,∞)
|Hχ2(Pn; )− Hχ2(P ; )|. (123)
We depict the value of ∆n in Figure 2 (bottom). As shown, when the number of samples increases, |∆n|
tends to decrease which illustrates the uniform convergence established in Corollary 1. Due to the mismatch
between the empirical and true distributions, privacy and utility might be over or under-estimated, leading
to the variable sign of ∆n.
6.2 ProPublica’s COMPAS Recidivism Dataset
We now illustrate Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 in Section 3 through ProPublica’s COMPAS dataset [72], which
contains the criminal history, jail and prison time, demographics and COMPAS risk scores for defendants
in Broward County from 2013 and 2014. We process the original dataset by dropping records with missing
information and quantizing some of the interest variables. Our final dataset contains 5278 records. We choose
the private variable (S): Race ∈ {Caucasian,African-American}; the useful variable (X): PriorCounts ∈
{0, 1 − 3, > 3} and AgeCategory ∈ {< 25, 25 − 45, > 45}. Hence, the size of support sets are |S|= 2 and
|X |= 9.
Given n ∈ N, we choose n records from the dataset as our training set and another n different records as
our testing set. We use probability of correctly guessing to measure both privacy and utility. We compute
the empirical distribution Pˆn,train based on the training set and let Wn be the privacy mechanism that solves
the following optimization problem:
max
W∈WR
Uc(Pˆn,train,W ) (124)
s.t. Lc(Pˆn,train,W ) ≤ 0.65, (125)
whereWR denotes the set of randomized response mechanisms [16,81], i.e., the set of all privacy mechanisms
W with output alphabet X such that, for some ρ ≥ 0,
W (i, j) =

eρ
eρ + |X |−1 if i = j,
1
eρ + |X |−1 if i 6= j.
(126)
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Figure 2: Both privacy leakage and utility are measured using the f -information with f(t) = (t− 1)2. Top
left: privacy-utility function Hχ2(P ; ·) and empirical privacy-utility function Hχ2(Pˆn; ·). Top right:
corresponding optimal privacy mechanisms for  = 0.05. Bottom: largest (signed) difference between
Hχ2(Pn; ·) and Hχ2(P ; ·).
Then, we let Pˆn,test be the empirical distribution of the testing set and compute the privacy-utility guaran-
tees attained by Wn for this distribution. Finally, we evaluate the discrepancy between the privacy-utility
guarantees provided for Pˆn,train and Pˆn,test:
∆L,n , |Lc(Pˆn,test,Wn)− Lc(Pˆn,train,Wn)|, (127)
∆U,n , |Uc(Pˆn,test,Wn)− Uc(Pˆn,train,Wn)|. (128)
By the triangle inequality and Theorem 2, with probability at least 1− β, these two discrepancies are upper
bounded by
UpperBoundn , 2
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β). (129)
Figure 3 depicts the discrepancies ∆L,n and ∆U,n, as functions of n, along with the upper bound UpperBoundn
for β = 10−1. Observe that when number of samples increases, the discrepancy between the privacy-utility
guarantees tends to decrease.
To further illustrate our results, we perform a similar experiment using Arimoto’s mutual information of
order 2. Specifically, we compute the privacy mechanism Wn by solving the following optimization problem:
max
W∈WZ
UA2 (Pˆn,train,W ) (130)
s.t. LA2 (Pˆn,train,W ) ≤ 0.05, (131)
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Figure 3: Both privacy leakage and utility are measured using probability of correctly guessing. Left:
discrepancy between utility guarantees for the training and testing sets. Right: discrepancy between
privacy guarantees for the training and testing sets. In both pictures the theoretical upper bound in (129)
is shown in red.
where WZ denotes the set of privacy mechanisms W with output alphabet X such that, for some x¯ ∈ X and
ζ ≥ 0,
W (i, j) =

1 if i = j = x¯,
1− ζ if i = j 6= x¯,
ζ if i 6= x¯, j = x¯.
(132)
In the binary case, WZ is nothing but the collection of Z-channels. It has been proved [17] that these
channels are capable to achieve optimal privacy-utility trade-offs in some cases. Let ∆L,n (resp. ∆U,n) be
the discrepancy between the privacy (resp. utility) guarantees for Pˆn,train and Pˆn,test. By Theorem 4, with
probability at least 1− β, ∆L,n and ∆U,n are upper bounded by
Privacy: UpperBoundn , 8
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β) · |S|, (133)
Utility: UpperBoundn , 8
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β) · |X |, (134)
respectively. Figure 4 depicts the discrepancies ∆L,n and ∆U,n, as functions of n, along with their corre-
sponding upper bounds for β = 10−1.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this work, we analyzed the effect of a limited sample size on the disclosure of data under privacy constraints.
We considered a setting where data is released upon observing non-private features correlated with a set
of private features. We evaluated privacy and utility using one out of five of the most commonly used
information leakage and utility measures in information-theoretic privacy: probability of correctly guessing,
f -information, Arimoto’s mutual information, Sibson’s mutual information, and maximal α-leakage.
The effect of a limited sample size was assessed via probabilistic upper bounds for the difference between
the privacy-utility guarantees for the empirical and true distributions. An important feature of these bounds
is that they are completely independent of the privacy mechanism at hand. On a technical level, the proofs of
these bounds depend on large deviations results already available in the literature and continuity properties
of information leakage measures established in this work. Furthermore, we have established new continuity
properties of privacy-utility functions. Using these properties, we have shown that the limit of a convergent
sequence of optimal privacy mechanisms is an optimal privacy mechanism itself.
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Figure 4: Both privacy leakage and utility are measured using Arimoto’s mutual information of order 2.
Left: discrepancy between utility guarantees for the training and testing sets. Right: discrepancy between
privacy guarantees for the training and testing sets. The theoretical upper bounds, in (133) and (134)
respectively, are shown in red.
In order to mitigate the effect of a limited sample size on the privacy guarantees delivered to the true
distribution, we introduced the notion of uniform privacy mechanisms. By definition, these mechanisms
provide a specific privacy guarantee for every distribution in a given subset of the probability simplex. In
particular, when this subset is a neighborhood of the empirical distribution, large deviations results imply
that privacy is guaranteed for the true distribution with high probability. While the construction of optimal
uniform privacy mechanisms might be challenging, we proved that these mechanisms can be approximated
in a natural way by optimal privacy mechanisms in the non-uniform sense. More specifically, we have proved
that an optimal privacy mechanism for the empirical distribution delivers a slightly weaker privacy guarantee
for a whole neighborhood of the empirical distribution and performs almost as well as any optimal uniform
privacy mechanism. By establishing convergence results regarding optimal uniform privacy mechanisms,
we have further exhibited the intrinsic relation between optimal privacy mechanisms and their uniform
counterparts.
While this work predominantly focused on large deviations bounds, the continuity properties derived
in this paper can be applied together with contemporary results to derive similar upper bounds in other
estimation frameworks, e.g., `1 minimax estimation.
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A Proofs from Section 3
A.1 Lemma 1
Consider the following elementary lemma whose proof is included for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 9. Let Q1, Q2 ∈ P and W ∈ W be given. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Si → Xi → Yi be such that
PSi,Xi = Qi and PYi|Xi = W . Then,
‖PS1,Y1 − PS2,Y2‖1≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (135)
Proof. By the definition of ‖·‖1, we have that
‖PS1,Y1 − PS2,Y2‖1=
∑
s∈S
∑
y∈Y
|PS1,Y1(s, y)− PS2,Y2(s, y)|. (136)
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By assumption, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, PSi,Yi(s, y) =
∑
xQi(s, x)W (x, y). Hence, by the triangle inequality,
‖PS1,Y1 − PS2,Y2‖1 ≤
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
∑
x∈X
|Q1(s, x)−Q2(s, x)|W (x, y) (137)
= ‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (138)
where we used the fact that
∑
yW (x, y) = 1 for all x ∈ X .
The proof of Lemma 1 relies on the following elementary observation: Let n ∈ N. If ai, bi ∈ R for all
i = 1, . . . , n, then ∣∣∣∣ maxi=1,...,n ai − maxi=1,...,n bi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxi=1,...,n|ai − bi|≤
n∑
i=1
|ai − bi|. (139)
Proof. For ease of notation, let ∆L , |Lc(Q1,W ) − Lc(Q2,W )|. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Si → Xi → Yi be
such that PSi,Xi = Qi and PYi|Xi = W . With this notation, Lc(Qi,W ) = Pc(Si|Yi) where
Pc(Si|Yi) =
∑
y∈Y
max
s∈S
PSi,Yi(s, y). (140)
By the triangle inequality, we have that
∆L ≤
∑
y∈Y
∣∣∣∣maxs∈S PS1,Y1(s, y)−maxs∈S PS2,Y2(s, y)
∣∣∣∣ . (141)
An immediate application of (139) leads to
∆L ≤
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
|PS1,Y1(s, y)− PS2,Y2(s, y)| (142)
= ‖PS1,Y1 − PS2,Y2‖1 (143)
≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (144)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 9. Mutatis mutandis, it can be shown that
|Uc(Q1,W )− Uc(Q2,W )| ≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (145)
as required.
A.2 Lemma 2
The proof of the following lemma is similar to the one of Lemma 9. The details are left to the reader.
Lemma 10. Let Q1, Q2 ∈ P and W ∈ W be given. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Si → Xi → Yi be such that
PSi,Xi = Qi and PYi|Xi = W . Then,
‖PY1 − PY2‖1≤ max{‖PS1 − PS2‖1, ‖PX1 − PX2‖1} ≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (146)
Now we are in position to prove Lemma 2.
Proof. For ease of notation, let ∆L , |Lf (Q1,W ) − Lf (Q2,W )|. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Si → Xi → Yi be
such that PSi,Xi = Qi and PYi|Xi = W . With this notation, Lf (Qi,W ) = If (PSi,Yi). By the definition of
f -information, we have that
∆L =
∣∣∣∣∑
s∈S
∑
y∈Y
(
PS1(s)PY1(y)f
(
PS1,Y1(s, y)
PS1(s)PY1(y)
)
− PS2(s)PY2(y)f
(
PS2,Y2(s, y)
PS2(s)PY2(y)
)) ∣∣∣∣. (147)
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An application of the triangle inequality leads to ∆L ≤ I + II, where
I =
∑
s∈S
∑
y∈Y
|PS1(s)PY1(y)− PS2(s)PY2(y)|
∣∣∣∣f ( PS1,Y1(s, y)PS1(s)PY1(y)
)∣∣∣∣ , (148)
II =
∑
s∈S
∑
y∈Y
PS2(s)PY2(y)
∣∣∣∣f ( PS1,Y1(s, y)PS1(s)PY1(y)
)
− f
(
PS2,Y2(s, y)
PS2(s)PY2(y)
)∣∣∣∣ . (149)
First we provide an upper bound for I. Recall the definition of the supremum norm in (41). Observe that
PSi,Yi(s, y) ≤ PYi(y) for all i ∈ {1, 2}, s ∈ S, and y ∈ Y. Hence, for all s ∈ S and y ∈ Y,
max
{
PS1,Y1(s, y)
PS1(s)PY1(y)
,
PS2,Y2(s, y)
PS2(s)PY2(y)
}
≤ max
{
1
PS1(s)
,
1
PS2(s)
}
≤ m−1S , (150)
and thus
∣∣∣∣f ( PS1,Y1(s, y)PS1(s)PY1(y)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ Kf,m−1S , as |f(t)|≤ Kf,m−1S for all t ∈ [0,m−1S ]. As a consequence,
I ≤ Kf,m−1S
∑
s∈S
∑
y∈Y
|PS1(s)PY1(y)− PS2(s)PY2(y)| (151)
≤ Kf,m−1S
∑
s∈S
∑
y∈Y
[
PY1(y)|PS1(s)− PS2(s)|+PS2(s)|PY1(y)− PY2(y)|
]
(152)
= Kf,m−1S
(‖PS1 − PS2‖1+‖PY1 − PY2‖1) . (153)
By Lemma 10, we conclude that
I ≤ 2Kf,m−1S ‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (154)
Now we focus on II. Recall that f is locally Lipschitz by assumption, and thus it is Lipschitz on [0,m−1S ].
As defined in (42), let Lf,m−1S
be the Lipschitz constant of f on the latter interval. Hence, (150) implies that∣∣∣∣f ( PS1,Y1(s, y)PS1(s)PY1(y)
)
− f
(
PS2,Y2(s, y)
PS2(s)PY2(y)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ Lf,m−1S
∣∣∣∣ PS1,Y1(s, y)PS1(s)PY1(y) − PS2,Y2(s, y)PS2(s)PY2(y)
∣∣∣∣ . (155)
As a result, we have that
II ≤ Lf,m−1S
∑
s∈S
∑
y∈Y
|PS2(s)PY2(y)PS1,Y1(s, y)− PS1(s)PY1(y)PS2,Y2(s, y)|
PS1(s)PY1(y)
. (156)
By the triangle inequality, the numerator of the quotient in (156) is upper bounded by
PS1,Y1(s, y)|PS2(s)PY2(y)− PS1(s)PY1(y)|+PS1(s)PY1(y)|PS1,Y1(s, y)− PS2,Y2(s, y)|. (157)
In particular,
II ≤ Lf,m−1S
∑
s∈S
∑
y∈Y
PS1,Y1(s, y)
PS1(s)PY1(y)
|PS2(s)PY2(y)− PS1(s)PY1(y)| (158)
+ Lf,m−1S
∑
s∈S
∑
y∈Y
|PS1,Y1(s, y)− PS2,Y2(s, y)| (159)
≤ m−1S Lf,m−1S
(
‖PY1 − PY2‖1+‖PS1 − PS2‖1
)
+ Lf,m−1S
‖PS1,Y1 − PS2,Y2‖1, (160)
where the last inequality follows from (150) and the argument used in (153). Hence, Lemma 9 and Lemma 10
imply that
II ≤ (2m−1S + 1)Lf,m−1S ‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (161)
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Since ∆L ≤ I + II, we conclude that
∆L ≤
(
2Kf,m−1S
+
(
2m−1S + 1
)
Lf,m−1S
)
‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (162)
Mutatis mutandis, it can be shown that
|Uf (Q1,W )− Uf (Q2,W )|≤
(
2Kf,m−1X
+
(
2m−1X + 1
)
Lf,m−1X
)
‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (163)
The proof is complete.
A.3 Theorem 3
Proof. By choosing Q1 = Pˆn and Q2 = P in Lemma 2, we have
|Lf (Pˆn,W )− Lf (P,W )| ≤ Cf,mS‖Pˆn − P‖1, (164)
where
mS = min
{{∑
x∈X
Pˆn(s, x) : s ∈ S
}
∪
{∑
x∈X
P (s, x) : s ∈ S
}}
. (165)
Observe that, for all s ∈ S, ∑
x∈X
P (s, x) ≥
∑
x∈X
Pˆn(s, x)−
∑
x∈X
|Pˆn(s, x)− P (s, x)| (166)
≥
∑
x∈X
Pˆn(s, x)− ‖Pˆn − P‖1. (167)
In particular, we have that
mS ≥
(
min
{∑
x∈X
Pˆn(s, x) : s ∈ S
}
− ‖Pˆn − P‖1
)
+
. (168)
Inequality (28) shows that, with probability at least 1− β,
‖Pˆn − P‖1≤
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β), (169)
and, thus, mS ≥ mS whenever (169) holds true. Recall the definitions of Kg,u and Lg,u in (41) and (42),
respectively. It is straightforward to verify that the mappings u 7→ Kf,u and u 7→ Lf,u are non-decreasing.
Since the mapping u 7→ u−1 is non-increasing, we conclude that
u 7→ Cf,u = 2Kf,u−1 + (2u−1 + 1)Lf,u−1 (170)
is non-increasing. Therefore, under (169), we have
Cf,mS ≤ Cf,mS . (171)
Combining (164), (169) and (171), we have that, with probability at least 1− β,
|Lf (Pˆn,W )− Lf (P,W )| ≤ Cf,mS
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β). (172)
Mutatis mutandis, it can be shown that
|Uf (Pˆn,W )− Uf (P,W )| ≤ Cf,mX
√
2
n
(|S|·|X |− log β), (173)
whenever (169) holds true.
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A.4 Proposition 4
Proof. Assume that S˜, X˜ and X˜0 satisfy that PS˜,X˜ = Pˆn and X˜0 = Πγ(X˜). With this notation, it can be
verified that S˜ → X˜ → X˜0 and
PS˜,X˜0 = PˆnPX˜0|X˜ = Pˆγ , (174)
where, by definition, (
PˆnPX˜0|X˜
)
(s, x0) =
∑
x∈X
Pˆn(s, x)PX˜0|X˜(x0|x). (175)
By assumption, W∗(Pˆγ ; ) 6= ∅. Let W˜ ∈ W∗(Pˆγ ; ), i.e.,
Lf (Pˆγ , W˜ ) ≤  and Uf (Pˆγ , W˜ ) = Hf (Pˆγ ; ). (176)
Let Y˜0 be such that S˜ → X˜ → X˜0 → Y˜0 and PY˜0|X˜0 = W˜ . Observe that PY˜0|X˜ = PX˜0|X˜W˜ . In particular,
PS˜,Y˜0 = PˆnPY˜0|X˜ = PˆnPX˜0|X˜W˜ = PˆγW˜ , (177)
where the last equality follows from (174). Therefore,
Lf (Pˆγ , W˜ ) = If (PS˜,Y˜0) = Lf (Pˆn, PY˜0|X˜). (178)
Furthermore, Lemma 3 implies that
Uf (Pˆγ , W˜ ) = If (PX˜0,Y˜0) = If (PX˜,Y˜0) = Uf (Pˆn, PY˜0|X˜). (179)
By (176), (178) and (179), we have
Lf (Pˆn, PY˜0|X˜) ≤  and Uf (Pˆn, PY˜0|X˜) = Hf (Pˆγ ; ). (180)
Recall that, by definition, Hf (Pˆn; ) = supW Uf (Pˆn,W ) where the supremum is taken over all W ∈ W such
that Lf (Pˆn,W ) ≤ . Thus, (180) implies that
Hf (Pˆn; ) ≥ Uf (Pˆn, PY˜0|X˜) = Hf (Pˆγ ; ), (181)
as we wanted to prove.
A.5 Lemma 4
Proof. For ease of notation, let ∆L , |LAα (Q1,W )− LAα (Q2,W )|. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Si → Xi → Yi be
such that PSi,Xi = Qi and PYi|Xi = W . With this notation,
∆L = |IAα (PS1,Y1)− IAα (PS2,Y2)| (182)
=
α
α− 1
∣∣∣∣∣log
∑
y‖PS1,Y1(·, y)‖α∑
y‖PS2,Y2(·, y)‖α
− log ‖PS1(·)‖α‖PS2(·)‖α
∣∣∣∣∣ , (183)
where the second equality follows directly from the definition of Arimoto’s mutual information. By the
triangle inequality, we obtain that
α− 1
α
∆L ≤ I + II where
I ,
∣∣∣∣∣log
∑
y‖PS1,Y1(·, y)‖α∑
y‖PS2,Y2(·, y)‖α
∣∣∣∣∣ , (184)
II ,
∣∣∣∣log ‖PS1(·)‖α‖PS2(·)‖α
∣∣∣∣ . (185)
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Notice that if a, b > 0, then
∣∣∣log a
b
∣∣∣ ≤ |a− b|
min{a, b} . Hence,
I ≤
∣∣∣∑y‖PS1,Y1(·, y)‖α−∑y‖PS2,Y2(·, y)‖α∣∣∣
min{∑y‖PS1,Y1(·, y)‖α,∑y‖PS2,Y2(·, y)‖α} . (186)
Observe that, by the triangle inequality,∣∣∣∣∑
y∈Y
‖PS1,Y1(·, y)‖α−
∑
y∈Y
‖PS2,Y2(·, y)‖α
∣∣∣∣ ≤∑
y∈Y
∣∣∣‖PS1,Y1(·, y)‖α−‖PS2,Y2(·, y)‖α∣∣∣. (187)
By Minkowski’s inequality, |‖a‖α−‖b‖α|≤ ‖a− b‖α for every a, b ∈ Rn and α ≥ 1. Therefore,∣∣∣∣∑
y∈Y
‖PS1,Y1(·, y)‖α−
∑
y∈Y
‖PS2,Y2(·, y)‖α
∣∣∣∣ ≤∑
y∈Y
‖PS1,Y1(·, y)− PS2,Y2(·, y)‖α (188)
≤
∑
y∈Y
‖PS1,Y1(·, y)− PS2,Y2(·, y)‖1, (189)
= ‖PS1,Y1 − PS2,Y2‖1, (190)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that ‖a‖α≤ ‖a‖1 for all a ∈ Rn and α ≥ 1. By assumption,
we have that PY1|X1 = W = PY2|X2 . Hence, Lemma 9 implies that
‖PS1,Y1 − PS2,Y2‖1≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (191)
This leads to ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y∈Y
‖PS1,Y1(·, y)‖α−
∑
y∈Y
‖PS2,Y2(·, y)‖α
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (192)
For i ∈ {1, 2}, Minkowski’s inequality implies that∑
y∈Y
‖PSi,Yi(·, y)‖α≥
∥∥∥∥∑
y∈Y
PSi,Yi(·, y)
∥∥∥∥
α
= ‖PSi(·)‖α. (193)
The generalized mean inequality implies that
‖PSi(·)‖α≥ |S|1/α−1‖PSi(·)‖1= |S|1/α−1, (194)
as ‖PSi(·)‖1=
∑
s PSi(s) = 1. Hence, ∑
y∈Y
‖PSi,Yi(·, y)‖α≥ |S|1/α−1. (195)
Therefore, by plugging (192) and (195) in (186),
I ≤ |S|1−1/α‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (196)
Similarly, we have that
II ≤ |‖PS2(·)‖α−‖PS1(·)‖α|
min{‖PS2(·)‖α, ‖PS1(·)‖α}
. (197)
As in (190) and (191),
|‖PS2(·)‖α−‖PS1(·)‖α|≤ ‖PS1 − PS2‖1≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (198)
As established in (195), for all i ∈ {1, 2},
‖PSi(·)‖α≥ |S|1/α−1. (199)
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Thus, II ≤ |S|1−1/α‖Q1 −Q2‖1. Since α− 1
α
∆L ≤ I + II, we conclude that
|LAα (Q1,W )− LAα (Q2,W )|≤
2α
α− 1 |S|
1−1/α‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (200)
Mutatis mutandis, one can obtain that
|UAα (Q1,W )− UAα (Q2,W )|≤
2α
α− 1 |X |
1−1/α‖Q1 −Q2‖1, (201)
as required
A.6 Lemma 5
Consider the following lemma.
Lemma 11. If S1, S2 and X1, X2 are random variables supported over S and X respectively, then,
‖PS1 · PX1|S1 − PS1 · PX2|S2‖1≤ 2‖PS1,X1 − PS2,X2‖1. (202)
Proof. For ease of notation, let ∆ , ‖PS1 · PX1|S1 − PS1 · PX2|S2‖1. By the triangle inequality, we have that
∆ ≤ ‖PS1 · PX1|S1 − PS2 · PX2|S2‖1+‖PS2 · PX2|S2 − PS1 · PX2|S2‖1. (203)
By Lemma 10, and the fact that PSi · PXi|Si = PSi,Xi for every i ∈ {1, 2},
∆ ≤ ‖PS1,X1 − PS2,X2‖1+‖PS1 − PS2‖1≤ 2‖PS1,X1 − PS2,X2‖1, (204)
as required.
Now we are in position to prove Lemma 5.
Proof. For ease of notation, let ∆L , |LSα(Q1,W ) − LSα(Q2,W )|. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Si → Xi → Yi be
such that PSi,Xi = Qi and PYi|Xi = W . Assume that α ∈ (1,∞). Then
∆L = |ISα(PS1,Y1)− ISα(PS2,Y2)| (205)
=
α
α− 1
∣∣∣∣∣log
∑
y‖PS1(·)1/αPY1|S1(y|·)‖α∑
y‖PS2(·)1/αPY2|S2(y|·)‖α
∣∣∣∣∣ , (206)
where the second equality follows directly from the definition of Sibson’s mutual information. Notice that if
a, b > 0, then
∣∣∣log a
b
∣∣∣ ≤ |a− b|
min{a, b} . Hence,
∆L ≤ α
α− 1
|∑y‖PS1(·)1/αPY1|S1(y|·)‖α−∑y‖PS2(·)1/αPY2|S2(y|·)‖α|
min{∑y‖PS1(·)1/αPY1|S1(y|·)‖α,∑y‖PS2(·)1/αPY2|S2(y|·)‖α} . (207)
By Minkowski’s inequality, we have that∑
y∈Y
‖PSi(·)1/αPYi|Si(y|·)‖α≥ ‖PSi(·)1/α‖α= 1, (208)
where we used the fact that
∑
y PYi|Si(y|s) = 1 for every s ∈ S and i ∈ {1, 2}. Hence, (207) becomes
∆L ≤ α
α− 1
∑
y∈Y
∣∣∣∣‖PS1(·)1/αPY1|S1(y|·)‖α−‖PS2(·)1/αPY2|S2(y|·)‖α∣∣∣∣ (209)
≤ α
α− 1
∑
y∈Y
‖PS1(·)1/αPY1|S1(y|·)− PS2(·)1/αPY2|S2(y|·)‖α, (210)
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where the last inequality follows from another application of Minkowski’s inequality. Since ‖a‖α≤ ‖a‖1 for
all a ∈ Rn and α > 1, we obtain that
∆L ≤ α
α− 1
∑
y∈Y
‖PS1(·)1/αPY1|S1(y|·)− PS2(·)1/αPY2|S2(y|·)‖1. (211)
Observe that, for each i ∈ {1, 2},
PSi(s)
1/αPYi|Si(y|s) =
∑
x∈X
PSi(s)
1/αPXi|Si(x|s)W (x, y). (212)
Thus, a straightforward manipulation leads to
∆L ≤ α
α− 1
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
‖PS1(·)1/αPX1|S1(x|·)− PS2(·)1/αPX2|S2(x|·)‖1W (x, y) (213)
=
α
α− 1
∑
x∈X
‖PS1(·)1/αPX1|S1(x|·)− PS2(·)1/αPX2|S2(x|·)‖1. (214)
By adding and subtracting the term PS1(·)1/αPX2|S2(x|·) inside the norm in (214), Minkowski’s inequality
implies that
α− 1
α
∆L ≤
∑
x
Ix +
∑
x
IIx where, for each x ∈ X ,
Ix , ‖PS1(·)1/α(PX1|S1(x|·)− PX2|S2(x|·))‖1, (215)
IIx , ‖(PS1(·)1/α − PS2(·)1/α)PX2|S2(x|·)‖1. (216)
Observe that, for each x ∈ X ,
Ix =
∑
s∈S
PS1(s)
1/α|PX1|S1(x|s)− PX2|S2(x|s)| (217)
=
∑
s∈S
PS1(s)
PS1(s)
1−1/α |PX1|S1(x|s)− PX2|S2(x|s)|. (218)
Since PS1(s) ≥ mS for all s ∈ S, we obtain that∑
x∈X
Ix ≤ 1
m
1−1/α
S
∑
x∈X
∑
s∈S
PS1(s)|PX1|S1(x|s)− PX2|S2(x|s)| (219)
=
‖PS1 · PX1|S1 − PS1 · PX2|S2‖1
m
1−1/α
S
. (220)
Therefore, Lemma 11 leads to ∑
x∈X
Ix ≤ 2‖Q1 −Q2‖1
m
1−1/α
S
. (221)
By definition, IIx =
∑
s|PS1(s)1/α − PS2(s)1/α|PX2|S2(x|s) for every x ∈ X . Hence,∑
x∈X
IIx =
∑
s∈S
|PS1(·)1/α − PS2(·)1/α|. (222)
Since the function t 7→ t1/α is Lipschitz continuous on [mS , 1] with Lipschitz constant (αm1−1/αS )−1,∑
x∈X
IIx ≤ ‖PS1 − PS2‖1
αm
1−1/α
S
≤ ‖Q1 −Q2‖1
αm
1−1/α
S
, (223)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 10. By (221) and (223), we conclude that
∆L ≤ 2α+ 1
α− 1
‖Q1 −Q2‖1
m
1−1/α
S
. (224)
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Mutatis mutandis, it can be shown that
|USα(Q1,W )− USα(Q2,W )|≤
1
α− 1
‖Q1 −Q2‖1
m
1−1/α
X
. (225)
Recall that limα→∞ ISα(PX,Y ) = I
S
∞(PX,Y ) [31]. Therefore, (71) follows after taking the limit α→∞ in
both sides of (225). Using a similar argument as above, it can be shown that
∆L ≤
∑
s∈S
∑
x∈X
|PX1|S1(x|s)− PX2|S2(x|s)| (226)
≤ 1
mins′ PS1(s
′)
∑
s∈S
∑
x∈X
PS1(s)|PX1|S1(x|s)− PX2|S2(x|s)| (227)
=
‖PS1 · PX1|S1 − PS1 · PX2|S2|‖1
mins′ PS1(s
′)
. (228)
By applying Lemma 11 and noting that mins′ PS1(s
′) = mins′
∑
xQ1(s
′, x), the result follows.
A.7 Lemma 6
Proof. For ease of notation, let ∆L , |Lmaxα (Q1,W )− Lmaxα (Q2,W )|. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Si → Xi → Yi
be such that PSi,Xi = Qi and PYi|Xi = W . Observe that PYi|Si = PXi|SiW where, by definition,(
PXi|SiW
)
(y|s) =
∑
x∈X
PXi|Si(x|s)W (x, y). (229)
In particular,
Lmaxα (Qi,W ) , sup
PS˜
IAα (PS˜ · PYi|Si) (230)
= sup
PS˜
IAα (PS˜ · PXi|SiW ). (231)
By the definition of LAα (Q,W ), we have that
Lmaxα (Qi,W ) = sup
PS˜
LAα (PS˜ · PXi|Si ,W ). (232)
It is easy to verify that if I is an arbitrary index set and aι, bι ∈ R for all ι ∈ I, then∣∣∣∣sup
ι∈I
aι − sup
ι∈I
bι
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
ι∈I
|aι − bι|. (233)
Therefore, (232) implies that
∆L =
∣∣∣∣∣supPS˜ LAα (PS˜ · PX1|S1 ,W )− supPS˜ LAα (PS˜ · PX2|S2 ,W )
∣∣∣∣∣ (234)
≤ sup
PS˜
∣∣LAα (PS˜ · PX1|S1 ,W )− LAα (PS˜ · PX2|S2 ,W )∣∣ . (235)
By Lemma 4, we obtain that
∆L ≤ 2α
α− 1 |S|
1−1/αsup
PS˜
‖PS˜ · PX1|S1 − PS˜ · PX2|S2‖1. (236)
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A straightforward computation shows that, for any PS˜ ,
‖PS˜ · PX1|S1 − PS˜ · PX2|S2‖1 =
∑
s∈S
PS˜(s)‖PX1|S1(·|s)− PX2|S2(·|s)‖1 (237)
≤
∑
s∈S
‖PX1|S1(·|s)− PX2|S2(·|s)‖1 (238)
≤ 1
mins′ PS1(s
′)
∑
s∈S
PS1(s)‖PX1|S1(·|s)− PX2|S2(·|s)‖1 (239)
=
‖PS1 · PX1|S1 − PS1 · PX2|S2‖1
mins′ PS1(s
′)
. (240)
Therefore, Lemma 11 implies that
sup
PS˜
‖PS˜ · PX1|S1 − PS˜ · PX2|S2‖1≤
2‖Q1 −Q2‖
mins′ PS1(s
′)
. (241)
By (236) and (241), we conclude that
∆L ≤ 4α
α− 1
|S|1−1/α
mins′ PS1(s
′)
‖Q1 −Q2‖1. (242)
By noting that mins′ PS1(s
′) = mins′
∑
xQ1(s
′, x), (75) follows. Finally, note that Umaxα (Q,W ) only depends
on W . Therefore, Umaxα (Q1,W ) = Umaxα (Q2,W ) which trivially leads to (76).
B Proofs from Section 4
B.1 Lemma 7
Lemma 7 is an immediate consequence of the following standard result whose proof is included for the sake
of completeness.
Lemma 12. Let (A, dA) and (B, dB) be two metric spaces. If f : A× B → R satisfies that
(i) |f(a1, b)− f(a2, b)|≤ dA(a1, a2) for all a1, a2 ∈ A and b ∈ B;
(ii) f(a, ·) is continuous over B for all a ∈ A;
then f(·, ·) is continuous over A× B.
Proof. In order to prove the continuity of f(·, ·) over A×B, we will show that for any sequence {(an, bn)}∞n=0
such that limn(an, bn) = (a0, b0), it holds true that limn f(an, bn) = f(a0, b0).
Let {(an, bn)}∞n=0 be such that limn(an, bn) = (a0, b0). By the triangle inequality, for every n ∈ N,
|f(an, bn)− f(a0, b0)| ≤ |f(an, bn)− f(a0, bn)|+|f(a0, bn)− f(a0, b0)| (243)
≤ dA(an, a0) + |f(a0, bn)− f(a0, b0)|, (244)
where the last inequality follows from assumption (i). By assumption (ii), f(a0, ·) is continuous over B. Since
limn(an, bn) = (a0, b0) is equivalent to limn an = a0 and limn bn = b0, we conclude that
lim
n→∞|f(an, bn)− f(a0, b0)|= 0, (245)
as required.
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B.2 Proposition 5
We start recalling an elementary fact about convergent sequences in metric spaces, see, e.g., [82, Exer-
cise 2.4.11].
Theorem 10. Let M be a metric space. A sequence (an)∞n=1 ⊂M converges to a ∈M if and only if every
subsequence of (an)
∞
n=1 has a further subsequence which converges to a.
We proceed with the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. In order to prove the continuity of H(·; ) over {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) < }, we will show that for any
sequence (Qn)
∞
n=0 ⊂ {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) < } such that
lim
n→∞‖Qn −Q0‖1= 0, (246)
it holds true that
lim
n→∞H(Qn; ) = H(Q0; ). (247)
In order to prove (247), Theorem 10 implies that it is enough to show that any subsequence (H(Qnk ; ))
∞
k=1
has a further subsequence converging to H(Q0; ).
Let (nk)
∞
k=1 ⊂ N be given. By Remark 7, there exists (W ∗nk)∞k=1 ⊂ WN such that, for each k ≥ 1, we
have that L(Qnk ,W ∗nk) ≤  and
H(Qnk ; ) = U(Qnk ,W ∗nk). (248)
Since the space WN is compact, there exists a further subsequence (nkj )∞j=1 such that
lim
j→∞
W ∗nkj = W0, (249)
for some W0 ∈ WN . Lemma 7 shows that U(·, ·) is continuous over Q ×WN . Then (246) and (249) imply
that
U(Q0,W0) = lim
j→∞
U(Qnkj ,W ∗nkj ) = limj→∞H(Qnkj ; ), (250)
where the second equality follows from (248). A similar reasoning shows that
L(Q0,W0) = lim
j→∞
L(Qnkj ,W ∗nkj ) ≤ . (251)
Therefore, by the maximality of H(Q0; ),
lim
j→∞
H(Qnkj ; ) = U(Q0,W0) ≤ H(Q0; ). (252)
Next, we show that limj H(Qnkj ; ) ≥ H(Q0; ). Recall that, by assumption, min(Q0) < . Let δ > 0 be
such that min(Q0) ≤  − δ. By condition (C.3), there exists W ′0 ∈ WN such that L(Q0,W ′0) ≤  − δ and
U(Q0,W ′0) = H(Q0; − δ). By the Lipschitz continuity given in condition (C.2) and (246),
lim
j→∞
L(Qnkj ,W ′0) = L(Q0,W ′0) ≤ − δ, (253)
lim
j→∞
U(Qnkj ,W ′0) = U(Q0,W ′0) = H(Q0; − δ). (254)
In particular, for j large enough we have that L(Qnkj ,W ′0) ≤  and, by the maximality of H(Qnkj ; ),
lim
j→∞
H(Qnkj ; ) ≥ limj→∞U(Qnkj ,W
′
0) = H(Q0; − δ), (255)
where the last equality follows from (254). Recall that, by condition (C.1), the mapping H(Q0; ·) is continuous
over [min(Q0),∞). Hence, by taking limits in (255),
lim
j→∞
H(Qnkj ; ) ≥ limδ↓0 H(Q0; − δ) = H(Q0; ). (256)
By combining (252) and (256), we conclude that
lim
j→∞
H(Qnkj ; ) = H(Q0; ), (257)
as required.
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B.3 Corollary 1
Before we prove Corollary 1, let us recall two standard results from analysis on metric spaces, see, e.g.,
Chapter 0.1 in [83] and Lemma 14 in [84], respectively.
Lemma 13. Let fn : [a, b] → R be a non-decreasing function for each n ∈ N. If there exists a continuous
function f : [a, b]→ R such that lim
n→∞ fn(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ [a, b], then fn converges uniformly to f .
Lemma 14. Let A and B be two metric spaces with B compact. If f : A× B → R is continuous, then the
function g : A → R defined by g(a) , inf
b∈B
f(a, b) is also continuous.
Observe that the infimum in the previous lemma can be replaced by a supremum. We proceed with the
proof of Corollary 1.
Proof. We first introduce
max(Q) , max{L(Q,W ) : W ∈ WN}. (258)
Observe that, by the maximality of max(Q), for all  ≥ max(Q),
H(Q; ) = H(Q; max(Q)). (259)
By Lemma 7 the function L(·, ·) is continuous over Q×WN . Since WN is compact, Lemma 14 implies that
max(·) is continuous over Q. By hypothesis limn Pn = P , thus limn max(Pn) = max(P ) and, in particular,
there exists 1 > 0 such that max(Pn) ≤ 1 for all n ∈ N. By (259), for all  ≥ 1 and all n ∈ N,
H(Pn; ) = H(Pn; max(Pn)) = H(Pn; 1). (260)
Observe that an analogous equality holds for P . Hence, we obtain that, for all n ∈ N,
sup
≥1
|H(Pn; )− H(P ; )|= |H(Pn; 1)− H(Pn; 1)|. (261)
As established by Proposition 5, the right hand side of (261) vanishes as n goes to infinity. Hence, we
conclude that H(Pn; ·) converge uniformly to H(P ; ·) over [1,∞). Finally, recall that the function H(Pn; ·)
is non-decreasing over [0, 1] for each n ∈ N. Furthermore, by condition (C.1), the function H(P ; ·) is
continuous over [0, 1]. Therefore, Proposition 5 and Lemma 13 imply that H(Pn; ·) converges uniformly to
H(P ; ·) over [0, 1]. This shows that uniform convergence holds over [0,∞).
B.4 Theorem 6
The following lemma follows directly from Lemma 14 by noticing that L(·, ·) is continuous over Q×WN and
WN is compact.
Lemma 15. Assume that conditions (C.1–3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
Then min(·), as given in (86), is continuous over Q.
We prove the following lemma which will be used in the proof of Theorem 6.
Lemma 16. Assume that conditions (C.1) and (C.3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given
N ∈ N. Then the set W∗N (P ; ), defined in (85), is compact.
Proof. Observe that
W∗N (P ; ) = {W ∈ WN : L(P,W ) ≤ } ∩ {W ∈ WN : U(P,W ) = H(P ; )}. (262)
Recall that, by condition (C.1), the mappings L(P, ·) and U(P, ·) are continuous. Since both sets in the RHS
of (262) are the preimage of a closed set under a continuous function, they are closed. Therefore, W∗N (P ; )
is closed as the finite intersection of closed sets is closed. Finally, we conclude that W∗N (P ; ) is compact
since it is a closed subset of the compact set WN .
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Observe that, by Lemma 15, limn min(Pn) = min(P ) whenever limn Pn = P . Hence, if min(P ) < ,
then min(Pn) <  for n large enough. Therefore, under the assumptions of Theorem 6, for n large enough
we have that the set W∗(Pn; ) is non-empty and, by condition (C.3), W∗N (Pn; ) is non-empty as well. Now
we are in position to prove Theorem 6.
Proof. We assume, without loss of generality, that W∗N (Pn; ) is non-empty for all n ∈ N. In order to reach
contradiction, assume that (91) does not hold true, i.e., there exists W ∗n ∈ W∗N (Pn; ) such that
lim sup
n→∞
dist(Wn,W∗N (P ; )) > 0. (263)
Since WN and W∗N (P ; ) are compact from Lemma 16, a routine argument shows that there exist a subse-
quence (W ∗nk)
∞
k=1 and W0 ∈ WN such that limkW ∗nk = W0 and W0 6∈ W∗N (P ; ). Lemma 7 shows that L(·, ·)
is continuous over Q×WN . Therefore, we have
L(P,W0) = lim
k→∞
L(Pnk ,W ∗nk) ≤ . (264)
Hence, by the maximality of the privacy-utility function, U(P,W0) ≤ H(P ; ). Using a similar argument, one
can show that
U(P,W0) = lim
k→∞
U(Pnk ,W ∗nk) = limk→∞H(Pnk , ) = H(P ; ), (265)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the mapping H(·; ) is continuous, as established in Propo-
sition 5. Altogether,
L(P,W0) ≤  and U(P,W0) = H(P ; ). (266)
Therefore, W0 ∈ W∗N (P ; ) which contradicts the fact that W0 /∈ W∗N (P ; ).
Furthermore, by the strong law of large numbers, (Pˆn)
∞
n=1 converges almost surely to P as n goes to
infinity. Therefore, if Pn = Pˆn, then
Pr
(
lim
n→∞ dist(W
∗
n ,W∗N (P ; )) = 0
)
= 1, (267)
as claimed.
Note that in the previous proof we implicitly assume that, for each n ∈ N, the (possibly random) privacy
mechanism W ∗n ∈ W∗N (Pˆn; ) is a random variable, i.e., a measurable function. This is a minor subtlety given
the rareness of non-measurable sets (functions) [85].
B.5 Theorem 7
Before we prove Theorem 7, let us recall some definitions and theorems from set-valued analysis [75].
Given two metric spaces A and B, a set-valued mapping F from A to B, denoted by F : A  B, is a
function from A to the subsets of B. The domain of a set-valued mapping F : A B is defined as
Dom(F ) , {a ∈ A : F (a) 6= ∅}. (268)
For r > 0, Ar(a) , {a′ ∈ A : dA(a, a′) < r} where dA denotes the metric associated to A.
Definition 10 (Definition 1.4.1, [75]). A set-valued mapping F : A B is called upper semicontinuous at
a ∈ Dom(F ) if and only if for every neighborhood N of F (a) there exists r > 0 such that F (a′) ⊂ N for all
a′ ∈ Ar(a). A set-valued mapping is said to be upper semicontinuous if and only if it is upper semicontinuous
at every point of its domain.
Definition 11 (Definition 1.4.2, [75]). A set-valued mapping F : A  B is called lower semicontinuous at
a ∈ Dom(F ) if and only if for every b ∈ F (a) and every sequence (an)∞n=1 ⊂ Dom(F ) with limn an = a, there
exists a sequence (bn)
∞
n=1 such that bn ∈ F (an) for each n ∈ N and limn bn = b. A set-valued mapping is
said to be lower semicontinuous if and only if it is lower semicontinuous at every point of its domain.
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By definition, a the set-valued mapping F : A B is continuous at a ∈ A if and only if it is both upper
and lower semicontinuous at a.
Theorem 11 (Theorem 1.4.13, [75]). Let F be a set-valued map from a complete metric space A to a
complete separable metric space B. If F is upper semicontinuous, then it is continuous on a residual set of
A.
The proof of Theorem 7 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 17. Assume that conditions (C.1–3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
For any  ∈ R, the set-valued mapping W∗N (·; ) is upper semicontinuous over {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) < }.
Proof. For ease of notation, let F : Q  WN be the set-valued mapping defined by F (Q) , W∗N (Q; ).
Observe that Dom(F ) = {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) ≤ }. In order to reach contradiction, assume that the set-valued
mapping F is not upper semicontinuous over {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) < }. In this case, there exist a joint
distribution Q ∈ Q with min(Q) <  and a neighborhood N of F (Q) such that for every r > 0 there exists
Qr ∈ Qr(Q) with F (Qr) 6⊂ N . For each n ∈ N, let W ∗n be such that W ∗n ∈ F (Q1/n)∩N c, where N c denotes
the complement of N w.r.t. WN . Since N c is closed and WN is compact, we have that N c is also compact.
Hence, there exists a subsequence (W ∗nk)
∞
k=1 converging to some W ∈ N c. Since F (Q) ⊂ N , we have that
W 6∈ F (Q). Recall that limkQ1/nk = Q by construction, and thus Corollary 2 implies that W ∈ W∗N (Q; ).
Since this contradicts the fact that W 6∈ W∗N (Q; ), we conclude that F is necessarily upper semicontinuous
over {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) < }.
Now we are in position to prove Theorem 7.
Proof. For ease of notation, let
Q(δ) , {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) + δ ≤ }. (269)
Observe that Q(δ) ⊂ {Q ∈ Q : min(Q) < }. Thus, Lemma 17 implies that the mapping W∗N (·; ) is
upper semicontinuous over Q(δ). Observe that both Q(δ) and WN are compact metric spaces. Therefore,
Theorem 11 establishes the lower semicontinuity of the mappingW∗N (·; ) on a residual set ofQ(δ). Theorem 7
follows immediately from this fact and Definition 11.
C Proofs from Section 5
C.1 Lemma 8
Proof.
(i) Let W ∈ WN be fixed. By condition (C.2), the mapping U(·,W ) is (Lipschitz) continuous over
Qr(Pˆ ). Since Qr(Pˆ ) is compact, the mapping U(·,W ) attains its infimum over Qr(Pˆ ).
(ii) Assume that DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r) is non-empty. By (i), we have that
Ur(Pˆ ,W ) = min
Q∈Qr(Pˆ )
U(Q,W ) (270)
is well defined. As established in Lemma 7, the mapping U(·, ·) is continuous over Q×WN and in particular
over Qr(Pˆ )×WN . Hence, Lemma 14 implies that Ur(Pˆ , ·) is continuous over WN .
Note that, by definition,
DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r) =
⋂
Q∈Qr(Pˆ )
DN (Q; ), (271)
where DN (Q; ) = {W ∈ WN : L(Q,W ) ≤ }. Condition (C.1) implies that, for every Q ∈ Q, the mapping
L(Q, ·) is continuous over WN . Thus, we have that DN (Q; ) is compact as WN is compact. Since the
arbitrary intersection of compact sets is also compact, (271) readily shows that DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r) is compact.
Therefore, the (continuous) mapping Ur(Pˆ , ·) attains its supremum over DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r), as required.
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C.2 Theorem 8
Consider the following lemma.
Lemma 18. Assume that conditions (C.1–3) hold true for a given closed set Q ⊆ P and a given N ∈ N.
Let  ∈ R and r ≥ 0 be given. If P ∈ Qr(Pˆ ) and − CLr ≥ min(Pˆ ), then
H(P ; ) ≤ H(Pˆ ; + CLr) + CUr. (272)
Proof. We start proving that  ≥ min(P ). Remark 7 implies that there exists W ′ ∈ WN such that
L(Pˆ ,W ′) = min(Pˆ ). By the Lipschitz continuity given in condition (C.2), we have that
L(P,W ′) ≤ L(Pˆ ,W ′) + |L(Pˆ ,W ′)− L(P,W ′)| (273)
≤ min(Pˆ ) + CL‖Pˆ − P‖1 (274)
≤ min(Pˆ ) + CLr ≤ , (275)
where the last inequality follows from the assumption −CLr ≥ min(Pˆ ). By the minimality of min(P ), we
conclude that min(P ) ≤ . Then, Remark 7 implies that there exists W ∈ WN such that L(P,W ) ≤  and
H(P ; ) = U(P,W ). (276)
By the Lipschitz continuity given in condition (C.2), we have that
|U(Pˆ ,W )− U(P,W )|≤ CU‖Pˆ − P‖1≤ CUr. (277)
In particular,
H(P ; ) ≤ U(Pˆ ,W ) + CUr. (278)
Similarly, since
|L(Pˆ ,W )− L(P,W )|≤ CL‖Pˆ − P‖1≤ CLr, (279)
we have L(Pˆ ,W ) ≤ L(P,W ) + CLr ≤ + CLr. Therefore, from inequality (278) and the maximality of the
privacy-utility function, we conclude that
H(P ; ) ≤ H(Pˆ ; + CLr) + CUr, (280)
as we wanted to prove.
Now we are in position to prove Theorem 8.
Proof. For any W ∈ DN (Pˆ ;  − CLr), we have L(Pˆ ,W ) + CLr ≤ . By the Lipschitz continuity given in
condition (C.2), for every Q ∈ Qr(Pˆ ),
|L(Pˆ ,W )− L(Q,W )|≤ CL‖Pˆ −Q‖1≤ CLr. (281)
Hence, L(Q,W ) ≤  and W ∈ DN (Q; ) for every Q ∈ Qr(Pˆ ). By (109), it follows that W ∈ DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r).
Let W ∗ ∈ W∗N (Pˆ ; − CLr) and W † ∈ W†Q,N (Pˆ ; , r). By definition,
U(Pˆ ,W ∗) = H(Pˆ ; − CLr). (282)
By the Lipschitz continuity given in condition (C.2), we have that
|U(Pˆ ,W ∗)− U(P,W ∗)|≤ CU‖Pˆ − P‖1≤ CUr. (283)
Combining (282) and (283) together, we have
U(P,W ∗) ≥ H(Pˆ ; − CLr)− CUr. (284)
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Since W † ∈ W†Q,N (Pˆ ; , r) ⊂ DQ,N (Pˆ ; , r) and P ∈ Qr(Pˆ ), (109) implies that W † ∈ DN (P ; ). Thus, by the
maximality of H(P ; ), we have
U(P,W †) ≤ H(P ; ). (285)
An immediate application of Lemma 18 shows that
U(P,W †) ≤ H(P ; ) ≤ H(Pˆ ; + CLr) + CUr. (286)
Therefore, combining (284) and (286) together,
U(P,W ∗)− U(P,W †) ≥ −
(
H(Pˆ ; + CLr)− H(Pˆ ; − CLr) + 2CUr
)
, (287)
which implied the desired conclusion.
C.3 Theorem 9
Proof. Recall that, by Lemma 15, the mapping min(·) is continuous over Q. In particular, we have that
limn min(Pn) = min(P ) whenever limn Pn = P . Since min(P ) < , limn Pn = P , and limn rn = 0, we have
that min(Pn) + CLrn <  for n large enough. Therefore, for n large enough, the first part of Theorem 8
establishes that the set DQ,N (Pn; , rn) is non-empty. Furthermore, part (ii) of Lemma 8 implies that
W†Q,N (Pn; , rn) is non-empty as well. Without loss of generality, we assume that W†Q,N (Pn; , rn) 6= ∅ for
all n ≥ 1.
In order to reach contradiction, we assume that the conclusion does not hold true, i.e., that there exists
a sequence (W †n)
∞
n=1 such that W
†
n ∈ W†Q,N (Pn; , rn) for all n ≥ 1 and
lim sup
n→∞
dist(W †n,W∗N (P ; )) > 0. (288)
Since both WN and W∗N (P ; ) are compact (Lemma 16), there exists a subsequence of (W †n)∞n=1 converging
to some W0 ∈ WN with W0 6∈ W∗N (P ; ). Without loss of generality, we assume that limnW †n = W0. By the
continuity of L(·, ·) established in Lemma 7,
L(P,W0) = lim
n→∞L(Pn,W
†
n) ≤ . (289)
The last inequality implies that W0 ∈ DN (P ; ) and hence U(P,W0) ≤ H(P ; ). Assume that we have
already proved that U(P,W0) ≥ H(P ; ). In particular, we would have that U(P,W0) = H(P ; ) and thus
W0 ∈ W∗N (P ; ). Since this conclusion contradicts the fact that W0 6∈ W∗N (P ; ), the result would follow.
Now we focus on proving that U(P,W0) ≥ H(P ; ).
Since  > min(P ) and limn rn = 0, we have that − 2CLrn > min(P ) for n large enough. Without loss
of generality, we assume that  − 2CLrn > min(P ) for all n ≥ 1. For a given n ≥ 1, let W ∗0 ∈ WN be such
that L(P,W ∗0 ) ≤ − 2CLrn and U(P,W ∗0 ) = H(P ; − 2CLrn). By condition (C.2), for any Q ∈ Qrn(Pn),
|L(P,W ∗0 )− L(Q,W ∗0 )|≤ CL‖P −Q‖1≤ 2CLrn, (290)
where the last inequality follows from the triangle inequality and the fact that P,Q ∈ Qrn(Pn). Thus,
L(Q,W ∗0 ) ≤ L(P,W ∗0 ) + 2CLrn ≤ , (291)
for any Q ∈ Qrn(Pn). Hence, W ∗0 ∈ DQ,N (Pn; , rn) and, by the definition of W†Q,N (Pn; , rn),
min
Q∈Qrn (Pn)
U(Q,W ∗0 ) ≤ min
Q∈Qrn (Pn)
U(Q,W †n) ≤ U(P,W †n). (292)
As in (290), we have that
|U(P,W ∗0 )− U(Q,W ∗0 )|≤ 2CUrn. (293)
Therefore, for any Q ∈ Qrn(Pn),
U(Q,W ∗0 ) ≥ U(P,W ∗0 )− 2CUrn (294)
= H(P ; − 2CLrn)− 2CUrn. (295)
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In particular, this implies that
min
Q∈Qrn (Pn)
U(Q,W ∗0 ) ≥ H(P ; − 2CLrn)− 2CUrn. (296)
Combining (292) and (296) together, we have
U(P,W †n) ≥ min
Q∈Qrn (Pn)
U(Q,W ∗0 ) (297)
≥ H(P ; − 2CLrn)− 2CUrn. (298)
Therefore, by the continuity of U(P, ·) and H(P ; ·) assumed in condition (C.1),
U(P,W0) = lim
n→∞U(P,W
†
n) (299)
≥ lim
n→∞H(P ; − 2CLrn)− 2CUrn (300)
= H(P ; ). (301)
This concludes the proof of the first part of the theorem.
Now we prove the second part of the theorem. Recall that in this case, for all n ≥ 1, Pn = Pˆn and
rn ≥ (2p log(n)/n)1/2 for some p > 1. Thus,
∞∑
n=1
Pr(‖Pˆn − P‖1≥ rn) ≤
∞∑
n=1
Pr
(
‖Pˆn − P‖1≥
√
2p log(n)
n
)
(302)
≤ exp(|S|·|X |)
∞∑
n=1
1
np
, (303)
where (303) follows directly from (27). Since p > 1 by assumption, we have that
∑
n 1/n
p is finite. Thus,
by a routine application of the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, see, e.g., [86, Sec. 2.18],
Pr
({
ω : ‖Pˆn(ω)− P‖1< rn for all n ≥ N = N(ω)
})
= 1. (304)
Observe that, by the last equality, the hypotheses of the first part of this theorem are satisfied almost surely.
A direct application of the former part of this theorem leads to
Pr
(
lim
n→∞ dist(W
†
n,W∗N (P ; )) = 0
)
= 1, (305)
as we wanted to prove.
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